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Abstract 
 
On February 17, 2008,Kosovo declared its independence. The path to independence 
and the claim to Kosovo was a long process that developed in three primary phases:  A) 
the fostering of territorial solidarity under direct rule and an emphasis on historical ties to 
the territory; B) the foundation of the national idea within the realms of proto-
nationalism; and C) the emergence of peripheral and mass nationalism.  This research 
seeks to define the development of nationalist ideologies in Kosovo and to explore 
where Roma fit within those ideologies.  An historical and sociological approach to 
nationalism in Kosovo is critical in understanding the current situation of Roma living in, 
and deported to, Kosovo, including the recent phenomenon of ethnic scapegoating of 
the Roma by both Serbs and Albanians.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kosovo, Roma, Nationalism, Yugoslavia 
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L'Italia è fatta. Restano da fare gli italiani. 
(Italy has been made; now it remains to make Italians.) 
- Massimo D'Azeglio (1868) 
 
Introduction 
 
In his landmark account of nation development, Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, 
noted that “Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so” (1992:12).    
Literature defining “nationalism” engages in theoretical debate as to its development, 
progression and outcome.  However, from theoretical analyses, there is a consensus 
that nationalism is an imagined, socio-political construct that creates a strong sentiment 
of “us” and “them.”   Real or imagined, there is no doubt the wave of nationalist 
ideologies washed a bloody tide over Yugoslavia.  As the tide receded, Yugoslavia had 
been ethnically cleansed and separated, her republics wrapped in militantly guarded 
national and cease-fire borders.   
 If, like history, historical memory and narrative are destined to repeat, such is the 
case with Romani victims of human atrocities.  Just as the Roma1 were largely 
categorized as “other” in the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, they are lost amidst the 
victims of Yugoslavia’s wars of ethnic cleansing during the 1990’s.  In order to avoid 
social stigma, Roma have a long history of integration into the dominant group of their 
society.  However, in this case the dominant groups were in conflict, resulting in a 
                                                        
1 Gypsy, and its equivalent European language terms, is often considered derogatory.   The 
Roma in Kosovo are divided into three ethnic groups: Egyptians, Ashkalija and Roma.  
Several subgroups also exist under these headings.  The groups do not consider other 
groups to be gadje, the Romani term for non-Roma, and they do intermarry, therefore I use 
Roma as an umbrella term for all three groups.       
 2 
situation where Roma were forcibly pitted against other Roma.  Those in the middle 
were expelled or murdered.   Unfortunately, at conflicts’ end, the Roma became the 
scapegoat of revenge for both sides.  Evidence of this is quite clear today throughout 
pockets of former Yugoslavia where Roma remain targets of vengefully violent 
discrimination and segregation.  Many European nations, including Germany, France, 
Italy, Switzerland, Norway and Belgium, are forcibly returning Roma refugees to 
Kosovo2, exacerbating ethnic tensions in an already unstable region.  For example, in 
June 2010, the UN Secretary-General reported a Roma woman wounded on 7 March, 
when a bullet was fired into her house near Priština. “According to a community 
representative, a few weeks before the incident the woman’s family had received a 
threatening letter asking them to abandon their property” (2010:5).  In the same report, 
the UN Kosovo Mission reported 275 “ethnic incidents” from January through August of 
2009, further stating that Roma groups are the most vulnerable in Kosovo.   
Given the rise of nations out of the ashes of ethnic conflict, how do nationalist 
ideologies view minorities?  More specifically, where do the Roma fit into the emerging 
nationalist ideology of Kosovo?   I intend to explore the answer to this question with a 
focus on the Romani minority within Serbia as a whole historically, narrowing in on 
present-day Kosovo as it works toward independence.  My research seeks first to define 
the emerging nationalist ideologies of Kosovo from a socio-historical to a more modern 
perspective; and secondly, to explore where Roma fit in the nationalist hierarchy, if such 
                                                        
2 “Kosovo” is the Serb name and “Kosova” is the Albanian name.  Countries that recognize 
independence refer to “Kosova,” while those that do not, especially Serbia, continue to refer 
to “Kosovo.”  Because this research is historical and refers to specific events and 
organizations, “Kosovo” will be used.  The usage is purely for purposes of consistency and 
is unrelated to any political intent. 
 3 
exists, within this polyethnic3 region.     
Historically, former Yugoslavian countries, including the autonomous region of 
Kosovo, are unique to other post-communist countries.   Titoist Yugoslavia (1953-1980) 
did not mirror other communist countries of the time by adopting assimilationist policies.  
Instead, Tito stressed equality for all under the banner of “Yugoslavic” identity and 
“brotherhood and unity.”   Nationalism, for Tito, was a bourgeois ideology that, along 
with capitalism, led to internal conflict.   Additionally, unlike other communist leaders, 
Tito did not create a centralized system of authority.  Instead, he gave recognition and 
self-rule to Kosovo and Yugoslavia’s republics.    
First, I will argue that historically shared conditions shape emerging nationalist 
ideologies of new countries in the region.  Therefore, I will begin with a foundational 
analysis of (un)nationalist sentiment in the former Yugoslavia, with a primary focus on 
Serbia, under Tito (1939-1980) and the collective presidency (1980-2000), including that 
of the infamous Milošević (1997-2000).  Historically, this research focuses on the period 
of the Second Yugoslavia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, existing from 
November 1943 to the dissolution of its borders throughout 1992.  The first Yugoslavia, 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, operated under a constitutional monarchy until Nazi 
occupation in 1941.  Second, I will outline a socio-historical account of how nationalist 
ideology has developed since the UN administration began in 1999.   Third, I will 
investigate where Roma fit within the nationalistic ideology of Kosovo throughout these 
phases in terms of social and minority status and non-Roma attitudes toward Roma.   
                                                        
3 With the emergence of new countries, the lines between nationalities and ethnicities blur.  
In order to avoid detailing that debate, and any confusion with nationalism, I use “ethnicity” 
to cover both nationality and ethnicity interchangeably.   
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Finally, I will examine the implications of nationalist ideologies for the future of Roma 
living in, and deported to, Kosovo, including the recent phenomenon of ethnic 
scapegoating of the Roma by both Serbs and Albanians.   
It is only recently that sociology has begun to examine “nationalism” apart from 
related concepts such as the “state” and “nation.”   The untangling of nationalism from 
patriotism and other sociological concepts provide a theoretical challenge.  While I 
intend to present opposing frameworks within my literature review, my approach both to 
nationalism and the Romani place within nation-building is Marxist-inspired, 
synthesizing the theories of Marxists such as Hobsbawm (1992), Hroch (2000), and 
Hechter (2000) into three distinct phases, A, B and C.    In connecting the place of 
Roma within nationalism, particular attention is paid to Miroslav Hroch’s nation building 
process in Europe, in which three keys shape the character of the nationalist 
movement:  
“(1) a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group - or at 
least of its core constituents;  
(2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social 
communication within the group than beyond it;  
(3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil 
society" 
(Hroch 2000:13).   
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Background 
 
Kosovo declared its independence in February of 2008.  In July 2010, the United 
Nation’s top court ruled Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is legal (International 
Court of Justice 2010). Serbia announced it would never give up its claim to Kosovo.   In 
order to best understand Serbia’s claim to Kosovo as well as nationalist attitudes in 
Kosovo amongst Serbs and Albanians, it is important to understand the history of this 
disputed region.    It is not the purpose of this research, nor of the researcher, to take a 
side in the recent war or the bid for independence, but to present a history that best 
defines the major events contributing to the development of strong nationalistic attitudes 
within Kosovo and her quest for independence.   Such a history also serves to 
demonstrate how the Roma of Kosovo came to be between two fires. 
In the Middle Ages, Kosovo was the base of the Nemanjic dynasty and the 
political, religious, and cultural capital of Serbia.    In 1386 the Turks invaded Serbia, 
setting the stage for one of history’s most famous battles, the June 28, 1389 Battle of 
Kosovo.  After a long battle upon the “field of the blackbirds,” Kosovo fell to Ottoman 
invaders.  Both sides lost the majority of their troops in what was essentially a tie.  The 
Serbs killed the Turkish King Murad, and prevented the Turks from completely 
conquering Serbia, but, low on troops, were ultimately forced to retreat leaving Kosovo 
to the remaining Turks.  The Serb leader, Prince Lazar, was captured and beheaded.  
The battle plays an important role in Serbian history and continues to serve as the 
foundation of Serbian myth, legend and national patriotism.      
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The Turks returned and by mid-fifteenth century, the whole of Serbia was an 
Ottoman vassal.   Albanians converted to Islam; Serbs did not.  The Roma, who had 
previously settled among the Serbs as they escaped slavery, began settling among 
Albanians.   As the Albanian population grew, Roma converted to Islam and counted 
themselves among the Albanians.  The Ottomans banned the Roma from nomadism 
and confined them to mahalas4, mostly within Priština where, according to an Ottoman 
census, 164 Roma families lived in 1525 (Malcolm 1999:203).  Meanwhile Serb society 
remained cohesive through the Orthodox Church and fostered the Serbian memory of 
Kosovo.   The forced religious division further served to inspire in Serbs a sense of 
nationalism that played itself out during a Serb revolt in the first decade of 1800.  
However, the Ottomans crushed the revolt causing over 100,000 Serbs to flee into the 
Austrian Empire.  As Serbs fled Kosovo, Albanians took their place.  Kosovo was 
becoming Albanian.   
Serbia continued to fight for Kosovo, failing in various coups until finally realizing 
victory over the weakening Ottomans during the first Balkan War in 1912.  By this time, 
Kosovo was majority Albanian and anti-Serb sentiment was rising.  Serbs viewed the 
Roma and the Albanians as Turkish leftovers who were impeding on their cherished 
Kosovo lands.   The Roma and the Albanians fled for the mountains as Serb peasants 
took their land and their homes.   
It has been argued that Serb nationalism was the spark that lit the flames of 
World War I.  On June 28 1914, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Gavrilo Princip, 
a member of the Serb nationalist organization Black Hand, assassinated Austrian 
                                                        
4 Mahalas are neighborhood quarters that are ethnically and administratively segregated 
from the dominant population.   
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Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.  When Serbia refused to meet Austria’s 
demands for justice, Austria declared war.  The sequence of events that followed, 
mainly the domino effect of allied declarations, increased tensions between Serbs and 
Albanians.  Albanians, eager to see  - and to help - Austria conquer Serbia, began to 
return to Kosovo.   Austrian and Bulgarian troops entered Kosovo, overwhelmed the 
Serb armies and sent them retreating into the winter mountains of Albania along with 
hundreds of Serb civilians.  More than half of the Serb population perished due to 
typhus and flu outbreaks, starvation, the harsh winter, or the violence of war.   In the 
end, the peace agreements of World War I drew the borders of a new Yugoslavia and 
returned Kosovo to Serbia.  Serbs returned to Kosovo and took their revenge on 
Albanians.   
The lack of cohesion among the many groups in Yugoslavia made the country an 
easy target for the Nazis.  German and Italian forces invaded Kosovo in 1941.  
Germany kept the mining towns of Kosovo, but handed the remainder over to the Italian 
occupied Albania, fulfilling Mussolini’s long held designs on Balkan expansion.   
Kosovo’s Serbs found themselves under Albanian rule and the target of Albanian 
revenge.  Thousands of Serbs were murdered or forced to flee Kosovo.  Roma 
throughout Serbia were rounded up and executed or dispatched to concentration camps.    
The end of World War II brought in the Second Yugosavia, under Josef Broz Tito, 
a communist partisan resistance leader.  Tito’s communist Yugoslavia suppressed 
nationalism in favor of Bratstvo i Jedinstvo - “brotherhood and unity.”5   In the 
                                                        
5 Brotherhood and Unity was the foundation of Yugoslav patriotism.  In the post-war 
environment it wasn’t the cornerstone of socialist relations, as the name may imply, as 
much as it referred to the war experience – the brotherhood of bloodshed and strength.  In 
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constitution of 1943, Tito granted Kosovo autonomy.  Tito’s split with Stalin made 
Yugoslavia the first state to break with Russia, but sealed the border between Kosovo 
and Stalinist Albania.  Albanians in Kosovo were to be Yugoslavs. Tito classified the 
Roma as a national minority, banned the word “Gypsy” and instituted quotas that would 
ensure equal education and employment opportunities.  For the first time in European 
history, Roma were treated as citizens – they were Yugoslavs.   Kosovo at last 
experienced relative harmony. 
Tito died in 1980.   Fully exploiting Serb nationalism, Slobodan Milošević 
garnered Serb support speaking to all Serbs from the battlefield of Kosovo, site of the 
famous battle so etched in the collective Serb memory.  Fearing Kosovo secession, 
Milošević repealed Kosovo’s autonomy and sent Serb police forces to Kosovo to instill 
marshal order.  The next ten years would give rise to the term “ethnic cleansing” (a term 
originally used by the Serbs to describe acts of the Albanians) as Serbs and Albanians 
armed themselves for a civil war that would eventually invoke NATO bombing of Serbia.     
Though the border between Kosovo and Albania is now open, Kosovo Albanians 
have no desire to become Albanians.  An entire generation has grown up with no sense 
of their homeland.  With Kosovo’s independence Albanians in Kosovo are now 
Kosovars.   Serbs remain, mostly in the north, and ethnic tensions still run high, 
resulting in violence on a near daily basis.  Bitterness toward the Roma runs on all sides.  
Accused of being traitors, deserters or cowards, the Roma remain trapped between two 
fires.   
                                                                                                                                                                                   
other words, as Malešević (2002) defines the message: “only when we fight together are we 
strong and powerful” (144). 
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Literature Review 
 
“[Nationalism is] a set of beliefs taught to each generation in which the 
Motherland or the Fatherland is an object of veneration and becomes a burning 
cause for which one becomes willing to kill the children of other Motherlands or 
Fatherlands.” 
Howard Zinn  
 
Conditions of Nationalism 
The literature on nationalism is a  “conceptual labyrinth characterized by 
questionable instruments, a lack of valid empirical data, and poor explanatory power 
(Dekker, Malová, and Hoogendoorn 2003:345).  It is a subject “fraught with difficulties, 
conceptual and empirical,” wrote Anthony Smith (cited in Guibernau and Hutchinson 
2001:10).   The literature is ambiguous in defining the concept of “nationalism,” and 
varies widely, intersecting across the following dimensions:  as the process of nation-
building, as a movement, as an ideology and form of behavior, and as a political 
orientation.   
Literature on nationalism tends to focus almost solely on origins, seeking to 
explain its cause rather than its effects.  Some argue nationalism is the result of 
modernity (Anderson 2006; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992); others maintain that it is 
rooted in more unique historical conditions (Armstrong 1982; Connor 1994; Kohn and 
Calhoun 2005); while others take the theoretical middle ground, arguing it is a 
combination of the two (Hroch 2007; Smith 1987).  Ken Wolf (1974) sums up the 
ambiguous nature of nationalism in a review aptly titled: The Historian, the Sociologist 
and Nationalism: 
Students of nationalism have generally handled their subject as if 
it were the proverbial elephant examined by the ten blind men. 
The political scientist, touching one leg, declares that he has 
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discovered the results of the doctrine of popular sovereignty or a 
clue to the coordination of interest group behavior. The 
psychologist examines another leg and "sees" men responding 
to a basic human need-an individual must work out or sublimate 
his problems by finding a higher group loyalty. The anthropologist 
touches the trunk and provides a structural-functionalist analysis 
of national symbols. Those interested in religion grasp the tail 
and discover a new religion, complete with liturgy, heaven, hell 
and redeemer; they too provide convincing interpretations of 
national symbols. (342) 
 
Wolf’s point is clear – commitment to a discipline prevents scholars from realizing that 
nationalism cannot be defined merely as a sum of its parts.  Therefore, a review of 
literature on nationalism must be interdisciplinary – that is, it requires digestion, in small 
bites, of the entire elephant.  
 Geertz (1973) and Shils (1957) carry the banner of perennial national, one that is 
tightly bound to the staff of culture.  They argue that nationalism has a primordial 
attachment that stems from the “givens” of social existence: descent, religion, language, 
and social practices.  History, language and common experiences form natural 
boundaries and divisions based on levels of comparisons.  That is, “givens” hold social 
values that become markers of identity, difference and societal cleavage.  Modern 
nationalism counters perennialism, arguing that nationalism is not historic and enduring; 
it is a modern development.  Because it is a mass movement, requiring mass 
communication to spread, it can only be a modern phenomenon.  Modernization 
theories are not as rigid as perennialist and fall under three types of modernization 
theories: social communication (Anderson 2006; Deutsch 1966; Rustow 1967), 
economic (including Marxist and non-Marxist) (Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000; Hroch 
2000; Nairn 1977; Wallerstein 1974), or political (Mann 1992).   The modernist key, 
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however, is that nationalism develops as societies transition from traditional to modern 
societies.   
Perennialist Nationalism 
The histories of ethnic wars, imperial expansionism and colonialism, genocide, 
and ethnic cleansing imply a deep connection of nationalism to ethnicity.  Perennial 
nationalism as an ideology and form of behavior is closely linked to ethnocentrism 
(Kellas 1991) and  the creation of “in-group” (majority) and “out- group” (minority) 
attitudes.  Anthony Smith’s assertion that nations have “ethnic origins” (1987) and 
Armstrong’s (1982) extensive historiography of nationalism require a perennialist 
examination of nationalism within an historical context.  Perennial theories of 
nationalism adhere to the idea that nations are built upon natural social groupings 
marked by cultural features such as language, religion, and a shared history.  This idea 
is especially relevant in the study of nations whose very boundaries have been carved 
and re-carved around ethnic identities.   An historical context is also particularly 
important in a study of Kosovo since there exists a common consensus that the break-
up of Yugoslavia was compelled by atavistic ethnic hatreds.  Indeed, even before its 
break-up, Banac (1984) blamed the nationalist problems of Yugoslavia on incompatible 
national ideologies, particularly the nationalistic idea of a “Greater Serbia.”  Almost 20 
years later, the same incompatible “Greater Serbia” presses upon Kosovo, making 
difficult her move toward independence, while fueling the development of an emerging 
Kosovar nationalism.    George and Patricia Klein, in their discussion of Yugoslav 
nationalism, reasoned that “all multinational states are balancing acts” (Klein and Reban 
1981:249).  In the case of Yugoslavia, Tito’s Communist Party not only maintained that 
balance, but also managed to freeze post-World War II ethnic unrest within the country.  
 12 
Liebach (1998) argues that the death of Tito, and, in turn, the death of Yugoslavian 
Communism “unfroze hoary national sentiments” , creating pockets of ethnocentric 
nationalism that would later manifest itself in national violence.  Breuilly (1993) 
recognized the propensity for increased ethnic tensions with the loss of political stability.  
He blames a lack of civil society in regions where there was mass membership in the 
Communist party.  When people have few, if any, ties to civic associations or 
memberships, they align themselves with the “institutional” nationalism of the state or 
the “ethnic” nationalism of locality (Breuilly, 1993:386-389).  When the state and locality 
are fundamentally incompatible, the very fabric of the “nation” becomes fragile and 
vulnerable.  Michnik and Matynia (1991) compare it to the opening of Pandora’s Box 
and also the “the last word of Communism” that acts as “a final attempt to find a social 
basis for dictatorship.  Kim II Sung, Castro, but also Milošević, the leaders of Serbia’s 
communists, are good illustrations of that” (Michnik and Matynia 1991).  That is, a 
causal link is developed between the end of communism and the rise of nationalism.  
The challenge of transitional society and the strains such changes set on the individual 
push people to adopt nationalist ideologies.  More importantly, the state of change 
makes people more vulnerable to manipulative nationalistic tactics.  Mungui-Pippidi 
(2004) argues that communism, by its authoritative nature, may have laid the grounds 
for nationalism.  The promotion of social envy, mistrust, paranoia and competition for 
essential goods created “fatalistic and passive political attitudes” (Mungiu-Pippidi and 
Krastev 2004:56).   This last theory seems to neglect the competiveness of capitalism 
entirely.  It rests on the notion that communism forced people to compete for essential 
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goods that were not readily available without recognizing that capitalism causes people 
to compete for the economic means to purchase goods that are readily available. 
Modern Nationalism 
While perennialist theories begin from a foundation of nation before nationalism, 
arguing that nationalism exists as an historical continuum, modernists stress 
nationalism is solely a modern phenomenon, and it is nationalism that makes the nation.  
Modernists understand nationalism only as it arose from modern institutions which 
“construct, preserve and transmit national identities, and which connect those identities 
to interests” (Breuilly 1996:151).  Any reference to historical nationalism, to the 
modernist, is charged as hollow “retrospective nationalism” (Hobsbawm 1992; Smith 
1987).   
The rise of capitalism, particularly the spread of “print-capitalism,” was an 
important contributor to nationalism according to Anderson, who views nationalism as 
existing within “imagined political communities” (2006:15).  Anderson argues that 
widespread print media is a precondition to nationalism, as it represents the use of a 
common language through which nationalist ideologies are disseminated.  As groups of 
people attempt to define their social and political identity in relation to other groups, they 
create a concept of social solidarity (community) that, in reality, does not exist.  
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) point out how, in the absence of historical continuity, 
nationalists invent traditions (anthems, remembrance holidays, monuments, etc.) and 
rewrite history in order to root nationalist ideologies within an historical context.  Is not 
Milošević’s parade through Yugoslavia with the 600-year-old bones of Prince Lazar a 
perfect example of invented history as a means to manipulate nationalist rhetoric?  
Breuilly supports the notion of imagination and invention, though he outright calls 
 14 
political nationalism a fraud.  There is a “special power,” unmatched in other ideologies, 
within the “self-reference quality of nationalist propaganda and the theme of a 
restoration of the glorious past in a transformed future” (Breuilly 1993:68).  The power of 
imagination and invention led Hobsbawm to note that “nationalism requires too much 
belief in what is patently not so” (1992:12).    
In contrast, Gellner (1983), a prominent modernist theorist, argued that 
nationalism is not invented, nor imagined, but that it is a very real and powerful 
response to modern political and economic conditions.  Nationalism, according to 
Gellner, has a direct and positive correlation to modern industrialization.  The process of 
industrialization requires a nation to transform a hierarchical, low cultured (agro-literate, 
peasant) society into a homogenous, high cultured (specialized, modernized) society.  
The modern state requires homogeneity to function at a high level – one common 
language, one common culture, and one common education all serve to create a high 
culture that “pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by that 
polity.  That is the secret of nationalism” (Gellner 1983:18).  Gellner’s theory is perhaps 
the most ambitious and widely used theory of nationalism in industrialized nations.  
However, it fails to explain nationalism in pre-industrialized societies or in contemporary, 
but non-industrialized countries like Kosovo.  Throughout the 1990’s Kosovo 
experienced mass de-industrialzation, disinvestments and mismanagement of 
operations, primarily of its mining resources.  Traditionally agrarian, the recent war took 
a heavy toll on Kosovo’s agricultural production, which is only now beginning to rise 
above subsistence level.  Still isolated from the world economy, Kosovo remains heavily 
dependent on foreign aid and is deep in remittance.  Since Kosovo gained her 
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independence, the economic situation has deteriorated.  Short on energy and rife with 
organized crime and corruption, Kosovo struggles to compete in the international 
investment market.   
Gellner’s (1983) “objective need for homogeneity”  of the entire population, a top-
down driven movement, completely neglects culturally diverse societies.    For cases 
that are not fully industrialized, we must return to the perennialist view.    For cases that 
betray the modernist view that nationalism attempts to homogenize an entire population, 
we must consider also Marxist inspired theories of inequality.  Ironically, Marxist 
theories are particularly salient when examining countries undergoing post-Communist 
transition. 
Marxist Nationalism & the Middle Ground 
The contradictory nature of Marxism and nationalism has been a thorn in the side 
of sociohistorical debate.   Most Marxist inspired theorists tend to accept a combination 
of perennial (history of oppression) and modernist (oppression by capitalism) views.  
These views would argue that both the invisible inventions of nationalism and the 
historical conditions of nationalism serve as a tool of exploitation and power of the 
bourgeoisie.   Tom Nairn (1981), despite his Marxist standing, quipped that “the theory 
of nationalism represents Marxism’s great historical failure.“  Nairn engaged in heated 
debate with Hobsbawm, the former insisting nationalism was a progressive movement 
that would lead to the end of the British Empire.  Hobsbawm, a Marxist historian and 
staunch anti-nationalist, believed nationalism would wither away with the bourgeoisie.   
To date, both theories are incorrect.   
Common themes in the literature of Marxist theories are internal colonialism, 
world systems, and unequal development.  Hechter (1999), in his landmark study on 
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British national development, argued against homogenization.  He found that the 
increased interaction of different ethnic groups, particularly under uneven industrial 
development, actually lead to ethnic conflict, rather than unity.   Hechter hypothesized 
that “internal colonialism” (1999:6) and uneven industrial development within Britain 
relegated the Celtic fringe (Ireland, Wales, Scotland) to a periphery position that is 
economically dependent on the core (England).   Hechter termed this strained 
relationship between the periphery and the core a “cultural division of labor” (1999:10).  
The periphery reacts with hostility toward the core, eventually leading to ethnonational 
movements that result in nationalism.   Hechter’s theory, often viewed as too 
reductionist (Smith, 1983), came under criticism because it focused on the Celtic 
division of labor, which was not entirely uneven, particularly in Scotland where “cultural” 
positions were traditionally high paying positions in law.  However, Hechter’s application 
of cultural labor division and uneven development to ethnonationalism should not be 
ignored in cases where nationalistic attitudes are those of the state majority.  Hechter, 
no doubt, was inspired by Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, reducing class status to 
capitalist interests and the nation to a “product of the capitalist world-economy” 
(Wallerstein 1987:387).   
The Czech historian Miroslav Hroch (2000), in his empirical study across small 
European nations, emphasized the social history of nationalism.  The process of 
nationalism, Hroch noted, contains three keys:  “(1) a ‘memory’ of some common past, 
treated as a ‘destiny’ of the group – or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density of 
linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the 
group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group 
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organized as a civil society” (Hroch, 2000: 13).   In Hroch’s theory, stages of national 
awakening coincide with and have been referred to as the “A-B-C Theory” - Phase A as 
the “period of scholarly interest,” Phase B as the “the period of patriotic agitation,” and 
Phase C as “the rise of a mass national movement.”  Phase A is the defining phase, 
typically when the three keys above take shape, during which groups seek definitions 
that set them apart from others.  Phase B is particularly critical as it enforces a sense of 
belonging and consciousness.  Phase C involves a mass movement that draws the 
lines of division between “us and them.” 
Hobsbawm, Hechter, and Hroch’s theories of the development of nationalism and 
nation-building essentially involve stages or criteria that yield the same result: strong 
nationalistic ideology that acquires mass support and leads to civil incorporation.  
Stages can be summarized as follows: 
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Table 1: Theory Synthesis and Triangulation Model 
Theorist A B C 
Hobsbawm (1992) Emergence of 
cultural traditions: 
1. Historic 
association with a 
current state or one 
with a lengthy and 
recent past. 
2. A long-
established cultural 
elite, possessing a 
written national 
literary and 
administrative 
vernacular 
3. A proven capacity 
for conquest 
 
Popular Proto-
Nationalism: 
Emergence of the 
“national idea” 
and beginnings of 
political campaign 
for this idea.  
Requires 
development of 
common 
language, 
ethnicity, religion 
and 
consciousness of 
belonging.  
Nationalist 
ideology acquires 
mass support 
Hechter (2000) Direct Rule with 
sufficient cultural 
homogeneity to 
foster territorial 
solidarity 
Temporal Lag: 
Time is required to 
build up effective 
political 
organizations 
 
Peripheral 
Nationalism: 
Culturally distinctive 
territory resists 
incorporation or 
attempts to secede 
 
Hroch (2000) Development of the 
“three keys” 
Activists strive to set 
the basis for a 
national identity 
through the cultural, 
linguistic, social and 
sometimes historical 
attributes of a non-
dominant group in 
order to raise 
awareness of the 
common traits—but 
they do this "without 
pressing specifically 
national demands to 
remedy deficits 
 
A new range of 
activists emerged, 
who sought to win 
over as many of 
their ethnic group as 
possible to the 
project of creating a 
future nation 
 
The majority of the 
population forms a 
mass movement. "In 
this phase, a full 
social movement 
comes into being 
and movement 
branches into 
conservative-
clerical, liberal and 
democratic wings, 
each with its own 
program 
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Theories of nationalism have been placed in theoretical boxes, constraining and 
isolating them rather than viewing how they work together to explain a rather ambiguous 
concept.   Instead of pitting theories against one another and pointing out their 
differences, a combination of theories may serve well to explain the rise of nationalism 
in Kosovo and how it led to secession and independence.  There are portions of 
primordial, modern and Marxist theories that apply to Kosovo throughout her tumultuous 
history.   Many of the theories discussed in this literature review will be revisited and 
further examined throughout this research.  However, particular attention will be paid to 
the theories of Hroch, Hechter and Hobsbawm in the above table as the “ABC” stages 
parallel the three time periods of this research.   
Scapegoating Theory 
The term "scapegoat" entered the English language within Tyndale's 1530 
translation of the Bible:  “And Aaron cast lottes ouer the .ii. gootes: one lotte for the 
Lorde, and another for a scape-goote.”  The story is of two goats.  One goat is sacrificed 
for the Lord during the rites of Attonement.  The second goat, bearing the confessions 
of all the people, is allowed to escape into the wilderness, carrying with him the burden 
of all the sins.  The second goat is the “scapegoat.”  The modern translation is in 
Leviticus: 
And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess 
over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in 
all their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat, and shall send [him] away 
by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness: And the goat shall bear upon him all 
their iniquities unto a land not inhabited: and he shall let go the goat in the 
wilderness. (Lev 16:21) 
 
In time, “scapegoating” came to refer to one who bears the blame for others.  Gordon 
Allport (1954) defined scapegoating as: 
a phenomenon wherein some of the aggressive energies of a person or a group 
are focused upon another individual, group, or object; the amount of aggression 
and blame being either partly or wholly unwarranted. 
 
According to scapegoat theory, when the level of frustration increases in society, people 
seek an outlet for that frustration.  Rooted within the frustration
scapegoat theory posits that frustration leads to prejudice and generates aggression 
that is displaced upon “scapegoats.”   Scapegoating, according to Allport, is the last 
process in a continuum of social relationships that ranges from friendly cooperatio
among groups to aggressive scapegoating:
 
 
Figure 1: Continuum of Social Relationships
 
Dollard (1967) outlines the process of scapegoating by three factors: first, there 
must be a  “store” of built-up aggress
release it on a target; and third, that target must be readily identifiable.  Within societies, 
instability, upheaval and change increase the collective level of frustration, which has 
the potential to build up anxiety and aggression among groups.  Citing the demise of the 
Soviet Union, Gibson and Howard 
                                                        
6 See Dollard, John, Leonard William Doob, Neal E. Miller, Orval Hobart Mowrer, Robert R. 
Sears, and Yale University. Institute of Human Relations. 1939. 
London, Oxford University Press.
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uncertainty, anxiety and perceptions of threat that can result in intolerance and 
prejudice.   
 Displaced hostility is rationalized through blame and stereotyping.  Allport (1954) 
refers to this process as “extropunitiveness,” the tendency to “see (and seek) outside 
agencies to blame” (349).   While individual acts of scapegoating do occur, when 
granted permission from an authoritative source, such as the government or religious 
leaders, society will divide itself among the aggressors and the scapegoats.  Shirking 
their own responsibility, political actors mobilize support for repressive actions against 
scapegoats in society (Howard 2007:198).   The blame for society’s problems shifts to 
innocent, often powerless groups, allowing others to feel free from guilt.   
According to theorists, scapegoats generally meet particular characteristics or 
conditions.  Girard (1977) contended that the scapegoat is an arbitrary victim that is not 
only vulnerable and on the margins of society, but close at hand.    The victims must 
also have specific traits that separate them into a group:  “distinguishing, salient 
characteristics” (Allport 1948:25);  women, members of religious, ethnic or national 
minorities, the poor (Girard 1986:22); with “little possibility for retaliation and 
accessibility” (Allport 1948:26).  Girard (1986) emphasized a power-laden perspective: 
victims of scapegoating are chosen because they “bear the signs of victims” (21).  Their 
very place in society as victims actually perpetuates their victimhood.   
Scapegoating does not relieve nor remove frustration.  As Allport (1954) explains, 
“It is not a successful drainage of aggression because the continuing frustration 
constantly builds new aggression.  Nature never created a less adaptive mechanism 
than displacement [scapegoating]” (351).  In fact, even when the conditions that caused 
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frustration are alleviated, the aggression initially directed toward scapegoats does not 
diminish.  Lessened frustration can actually increase violent ideologies toward the victim 
(Billig 1976; Newman and Erber 2002).  Perpetrators then seek justification for their 
violent actions, deepening commitment to scapegoat ideology and increasing its future 
potential.   The cyclic process results in a “continuum of destruction” (Staub 1989:17). 
Scapegoat ideology exaggerates the malice and power of the victim in order to 
legitimize blame (Friedländer 1997).  Hitler blamed all of Germany’s economic ills on the 
Jews and succeeded in convincing German society that if Jews did not exist, Germany 
would prosper for a thousand years.    After the Holocaust, the Palestinians became 
scapegoats for Zionism and the collective guilt of European countries that failed to stop 
the Holocaust.  Palestine and her people became the new sacrificial goat (Mueler 2002).   
Hovland and Sears (1988) found a correlation of anti-Black violence and economic 
recession that they attributed to the  frustration–aggression hypothesis that led to 
scapegoating.   
There has been little work done on scapegoating in relation to the instability of 
the former Yugoslavia.  Keith Doubt (2007) used scapegoating to explain ethnic 
cleansing after the break up of Yugoslavia.  Doubt points to the Serbian Orthodox 
Church as the aggressor that fueled Serb nationalism in an effort to “transform the 
organic solidarity of Yugoslav society into the mechanical solidarity of a particular ethnic 
group” (16).   Mechanical solidarity, according to Durkheim (1984), strengthens the 
collective consciousness, leaving little or no room for individual differences.  Because 
mechanical solidarity is repressive, restrictive and demands uniformity, it lends itself 
well to scapegoating of the “other” and to ethnic cleansing.   Although Doubt’s analysis 
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is remarkably one-sided, it does highlight the dangerous intersection of scapegoating 
and nationalism.  
In his Hypothesis on Nationalism and War, political scientist Stephen Van Evera 
(2001) touches on several dangers of nationalism that are complimentary to the process 
of ethnic scapegoating discussed above and the Roma of former Yugoslavia.   Of 
particular relevance is Van Evera’s discussion of the adoption by a nation of “distorted 
pictures of their own and others’ current conduct and character that exaggerate the 
legitimacy of their own cause“ (47).  The exaggeration, as in most nationalistic 
movements, is accomplished through varying degrees of myth making, including false 
blame upon the minority for past crimes.  The nation uses the myth of past crimes to 
justify subjugation and oppression of the minority – if they are left unsuppressed, the 
minority poses a danger (Van Evera 2001:50-51).  In this case, Serbs and Albanians 
alike morally justify oppression of the Roma because Roma were not (and are not) 
viewed as allies in the war and thus are viewed as present and future enemies of the 
nation.    Because the myth is perpetuated and vigorously defended by everyone but the 
Roma, the likelihood that it will be challenged remains quite slim.  The actions of other 
nations, particularly those with good standing in the United Nations, against Roma, 
including deportations, mass violence and widespread oppression, serve to further lend 
legitimacy to both the myth and the hostility that springs from its origins. 
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Methodology 
 
The design and methods of this research closely follow the case study design 
and methods of Yin (2009) and Stake (1995).  The research is a qualitative, 
instrumental case study with dual purpose: 1) to triangulate Marxist theories of 
nationalism to the case of Kosovo, and 2) to discover where Roma fit into Kosovar 
nationalistic attitudes.   Yin (2009) defines case study  inquiry as a method that: 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident . . . [and] copes with the technically distinctive situation in which 
there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result; 
relies on multiple courses of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result; and benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical proposition to guide data collection and analysis. (18) 
 
This case study seeks to understand nationalism in Kosovo within the context of 
civic and ethnic domains and to examine patterns of inclusion and exclusion of Roma 
across those domains.   Although the time period of study coincides with specific 
sociohistorical events from 1943 to 2010, the analysis focuses on the contemporary 
result of nationalist ideology and the region’s largest minority group with an eye toward 
future implications.   
According to Yin (2009), the chronological time-series analysis is an insightful 
technique for comparing chronology with that predicted by an explanatory theory, 
specifically when examined events are sequential and/or contingent.   By using this 
analytical technique, combined with theoretical pattern matching, this study seeks to 
compare the sequence of events leading to the development of nationalism with the 
events described in the theoretical framework examined in this research.   
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Data Sources 
Yin (2009) defines three principles of data collection that establish construct 
validity and reliability of a case study.  The first, a primary characteristic of case study 
research, is the triangulation of multiple data sources.  Multiple sources of data, when 
used properly, also serve to increase credibility of data (Yin 2009).    Sources of 
evidence related to each phase of examination are presented in Table 1 at the end of 
this section.   
The second principle of data collection involves maintaining a case study 
database to increase reliability of the entire case study (Yin 2009:119).  Documents 
collected during the study are organized within an annotated bibliography accompanied 
by corresponding notes.  Document notation will also help to recognize the document’s 
original objective, therefore increasing critical interpretation and decreasing overreliance 
on particular pieces of evidence.  All additional notes, correspondence and materials 
are stored, organized and categorized in electronic and/or hard copy format available 
for later access if necessary.   
Yin’s third principle is the maintenance of a chain of evidence that serves also to 
increase reliability as well as construct validity (2009:121-124).  Chain of evidence 
requires sufficient citation; availability of actual data, including the relevant time and 
place data were collected; consistent research procedures and questions; and finally, 
the research protocol should link back to the research questions.  The chain allows the 
reader (or future researchers) to follow the evidence from research question to 
conclusion and vice versa.   The chain of evidence is maintained throughout the 
research and is rigorously connected to sources within the database.   
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Interviews used for this research are drawn from a variety of primary sources.  
Several United Nations and nongovernmental organizations have conducted interviews 
during field visits to Kosovo over the period of this research.  Reports of these 
interviews are available within the organizations’ country reports.   Activist Paul 
Polansky recently published a three-volume collection (1,549 pages) of oral histories of 
the Yugoslav Roma before, during and after World War II. The collection, "One Blood, 
One Flame" was a three-year project, filming interviews with 154 Roma throughout 
former Yugoslavia. Each volume contains a DVD with filmed interviews recorded in the 
natural environment, thus allowing for a small degree of informal observation.  This 
research relies heavily on the filmed interviews.  Interviews conducted by The Balkan 
Project between January and July of 2003 are also analyzed.  Although the Balkan 
Project interviews were informally conducted7 their candidness and unstructured format 
provide an intimately valuable glimpse into the lives of Kosovar Roma.  Throughout this 
study interview data is identified as follows: 
Interviews by Polansky are indicated by a single asterisk (*) 
Interviews by the Balkan Project are indicated by double asterisks (**) 
All other interview data will be identified as they are referenced.   
  
                                                        
7 In an introduction to the project, Bobby Anderson discusses how they began conducting 
random interviews:  “We’re not scholars. We thought that we would paint a picture of a 
world that no longer existed. We’d find Roma that could remember a southeastern Europe 
before the borders were solidified, and later sealed. We got romantic; it was naïve, and it 
was stupid and wrong.” 
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Data Analysis 
Studying nationalist ideologies as everyday discourse is one of the most difficult 
tasks in historical research: the reception of ideological forms among ordinary people 
(Hau 2008).   This research will examine nationalism primarily from a cognitive 
collective approach, allowing a variety of methodological tools including content analysis, 
discourse theory (Sutherland 2005), and frame analysis (Snow 1988).  The foundation 
of this research requires tracing chronological periods of nationalism guided by specific 
theoretical propositions that set a blueprint for a three-step process of nationalistic 
development.   Data will be organized by patterns that give meaning to both the stages 
of nationalistic development and the place of Roma as “Kosovars” within emerging 
nationalistic ideologies.   
 
 
 
Table 2 Stages and Sources of Evidence 
STAGE Conscious 
Nationalism  
shared memory and 
culture of a particular 
territory  
Quiet Nationalism 
increased ties, build 
up of the national 
idea 
Mass Nationalism 
nationalist idea gains 
mass support, 
secession 
    Time Series      
ANALYSIS Sociohistorical 
analysis of shared 
memory, folklore, 
literature, linguistics, 
and cultural/physical 
borders 
Evidence of 
development of 
organizational 
groups, promotion of 
the national idea 
socially and politically 
Defining the 
nationalist idea, 
population of 
support, and 
strategies of 
independence  
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Table 2, continued 
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE 
     Primary Physical artifacts, 
interviews, newspaper 
articles, photographs, 
documentation, 
speeches, maps, art, 
literature, 
performance, film 
Organizational 
records, interviews, 
documentation, 
photographs, 
speeches, art, 
posters, 
autobiographies, 
court cases 
Audio, video, 
interviews, 
newspaper articles, 
interviews, physical 
artifacts, 
documentation, data 
sets, court cases 
     Secondary Oral histories, 
textbooks 
Oral histories, 
biographies, 
commentaries 
Oral histories, 
Internet, political 
policy, field reports 
     Tertiary Chronologies Documentaries Documentaries 
   
 
Coding 
Throughout the interviews collected for this study, I intend to use inductive coding 
to generate themes of information related to the Romani place throughout Kosovar 
nationalism.  For content analysis, I use both deductive and inductive coding.  
Deductive codes examine the development of nationalism and nation building according 
to the theories of Hroch (2007), Hobsbawm (1992) and Hechter (1999).   Therefore, 
deductive codes will be: memory, destiny, linguistics, culture, equality, territory, national 
consciousness, proto-nationalism, mass support, and folklore or myth.   
  
Limitations 
The primary limitation to this research study is the dependence upon secondary 
analysis of interviews and oral histories.   Interviews and other sources of evidence also 
have potential to lose data both in their transcription and translation to English.  Many of 
the Roma interviewed are elderly and have lived through three wars in Kosovo 
(Albanian, Word War II, NATO).  In some cases, it is clear that the memories of those 
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wars have blurred, skewing the chronological order, and making it difficult to determine 
the time frame discussed.  These particular failings of human memory limit the accuracy 
of oral histories.   In cases where time is unclear, I have either made a note or used 
terms to determine what the speaker meant.  For example, in one interview the 
interviewee begins speaking of his experiences in World War II, briefly mentions the 
NATO war, returns to World War II, but then begins talking about the UCK (Kosovo 
Liberation Army).  Because the UCK was a part of the NATO war, I attribute that part of 
the history to 1999.    
Implications of Research 
Kosovo is currently undergoing stages of socio-political development and its own 
identity as a nation, as it disengages from Serbia and UN administration, therefore this 
research offers an opportunity to examine minorities in the genesis of nationalist 
ideology.  An investigation of Romani status within Kosovo is also critically important in 
addressing much broader international policy issues of forced refugee returns into a 
region that has not yet established political independence and stability.    
Historical analysis of nationalistic attitudes in Kosovo lends itself to a spiraling 
pattern that has generated violence of neighbors against neighbors.  A more in-depth 
analysis combined with the experiences of minorities within Kosovo could serve as a 
predictor to conflict in ethnically diverse regions of Kosovo as well as other areas of the 
former Yugoslavia.  As Samantha Powers writes: 
Citizens victimized by genocide or abandoned by the international community do 
not make good neighbors, as their thirst for vengeance, their irredentism, and 
their acceptance of violence as a means of generating change can turn them into 
future threats (Power 2002). 
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Roma Identity in Kosovo 
 
“If I am Roma, then I am Roma, and I cannot be anything more.” 
Isak Avdo  
 
 
Ethnic identity among Romani groups in Kosovo is complicated.    Indeed, the 
very term “ethnic identity” is complex, involving internal and external factors that require 
a degree of political and social negotiation.  Kanchan Chandra (2006) defines ethnic 
identity as a “subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is 
determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent” 
(397).  Chandra’s definition differs from other academics in that it leaves out those 
aspects that are “only sometimes associated with the identities we think of as ethnic and 
thus cannot be thought of as defining characteristics” (397): common culture, common 
history, common territory and common language.  His definition is particularly fitting to 
the Roma because not all Roma share those common characteristics.  Those who have 
assimilated or practice ethnic mimicry often leave their cultural traditions and language 
behind.  Not all Romani groups speak Romany or the same dialect of Romany.  
Because the Roma community lacks an historical tradition (except among some elite), 
many Roma are not even aware of their historical heritage.  Too often, the history that 
Roma do have is that which has been told to them by Romani elite, often with a 
personal agenda, or by gadje (non-Roma).  Roma are a people without a homeland 
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whose diaspora has spread throughout the world, thus they have no common territory.8  
The use of this definition does not imply that Roma do not share the common 
characteristics typically connected with ethnic identity.  However, it is a common 
misunderstanding and, to some extent, stereotype that Roma are a homogeneous 
group.  They are a quite diverse group that can be differentiated by their sedentary or 
nomadic lifestyle, language, tribal affiliation, occupation and religion.   
Romani scholars use the terms ethnic and race interchangeably and 
ambiguously as applied to the Roma.  Both terms have evoked multiple definitions and 
charged criticism within the field.  In his aptly titled book Gypsy Identities, 1500-2000: 
from Egipcyans and Moon-men to the Ethnic Romany, Mayall (2004) notes: 
The views of authors change over time and the use of labels and boundaries can 
vary even within the same text and from one paragraph to another with no 
explanatory comment from the author or any indication or recognition of 
incongruity and contradiction. A confusion of labels is applied to the group, 
usually without any clarification of the reasons for the preferred use of one 
alternative over another. (14) 
 
With the exception of Ian Hancock, it is notable that the ethnic/racial labeling debate has 
been carried out by non-Roma.9  Hancock, a prominent Rom and professor of linguistics, 
argues that classification is far more complex than specialists comprehend.  Because of 
their interaction with various European groups and their fragmentation, Hancock (2004) 
argues that Roma have emerged as “a continuum of distinct ethnic groups constituting a 
larger whole” (18). 
                                                        
8 Indian origins theories, though strongly based on compelling linguistic evidence, are still 
inconclusive.  More importantly, many Roma are unaware of their possible Indian origins 
and others, like the Egyptians, dispute this evidence.   
9 For varying views on the race/ethnicity debate see (Acton 1997; Fraser 1995; Hancock 
1998; Kenrick 1998; Liegeois 1994; Okely 1983) 
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Without doubt, the most distinguishing feature of the Romani people is what has 
been described throughout history as difference, qualities that have given them markers 
of marginality within every community in which they have lived.  Like other minorities 
whose appearance and culture differs from the dominant white society, the term “race” 
arose to describe and differentiate them.  Fraser (1995) and Mayall (2004) both point to 
Macfie, Honorary Secretary of the Gypsy Lore Society from 1907 to 1914, as providing 
the fullest account of the features of the Gypsy race: 
The race is slightly dolichocephalic, or long-headed, and the average height is 5 feet 4.9 
inches. Their limbs are wiry, their movements vivacious, and their hands and feet small. 
Their features are regular, and in youth often extremely beautiful, though the mouth is 
not small; the teeth are good and white, and the nose straight with a tendency to be 
hooked. They are deeply pigmented, the skin of pure Gypsies being olive or even 
darker, and the hair straight and black with the peculiar blackness which is described as 
blue-black. The iris is dark, especially among the women, and the eyes have a lustre 
which everybody notices but nobody has yet succeeded in describing. (Macfie 1912:71-
72) 
 
Grellman, considered the father of Gypsy studies, wrote the first major study on Gypsies 
for his dissertation in 1787.  It is through his lens that future researchers framed the 
racial representation of Gypsies.  His lens was most definitely a very European one that 
contrasted whiteness with the way in which “the dark brown, or olive coloured, skin of 
the Gipseys, with their white teeth appearing between their red lips, may be a disgusting 
sight to an European, unaccustomed to such objects” (1787:10).    
Swarthy is a common adjective applied to Gypsies.  For example, in a book 
review for Borrow’s classic Isopel Berners (1901), Helen Biddell (1915) writes of the 
protagonist and her Gypsy friends: 
. . . this tall blonde of heroic mould, like a Norse queen, with fair hair hanging free, 
deep blue eyes and fine features, showed plainly that she was as far removed 
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from her swarthy gypsy companions, and as different from them, as light from 
darkness. (74). 
 
Writing about his bicycle trip around Hungary, Austria and Germany, Thomas Stevens 
(1885), utilizing the race term, also referred to the Gypsies he crossed as swarthy: 
Gangs of gypsies are now frequently met with; they are dark-skinned, interesting 
people, and, altogether different-looking from those occasionally encountered in 
England and America, where, although swarthy and dark-skinned, they bear no 
comparison in that respect to these, whose skin is well-nigh black, and whose 
gleaming white teeth and brilliant, coal-black eyes stamp them plainly as alien to 
the race around them. Ragged, unwashed, happy gangs of vagabonds these 
stragglers appear . . . The black eyes scintillate as they take notice of what they 
consider the great wealth of sterling silver about the machine I bestride. (175) 
 
These few quoted passages not only draw distinctions along racial color lines, but they 
expound upon an “us” versus “them” division, as well as an exotic othering.  
Photo 1
Eva Justin of the 'Racial Hygiene and 
Germany measuring the skull of a Romani
Today, in an environment of political correctness,
Roma rhetoric, but difference 
the most important aspect of Romani culture is the practice of 
Durkheimian equivalent of the sacred and the profane, the division between what is 
pure (vujo) and what is impure (
marimé is expelled from the community and considered a pariah.
                                                        
10 Roma have their own court system, 
member’s marimé.  
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:  Measuring the skull of a Romani woman 
Demographic Biology Research Unit' in Nazi 
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 color is largely absent from the 
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argues that the Roma’s determination not to assimilate stems in part from their belief 
that gadje are in a state of defilement because of their ignorance of the rules of purity 
and impurity (29).   Because the laws of marimé strictly regulate interactions between 
Roma and gadje they serve as a function of boundary maintenance between the 
Romani world and those outside of it.  Traversing the gadje’s world requires 
precautionary measures because most everything the gadje touches – dishes, utensils, 
countertops, toilets – poses a danger of impurity and disease.  Such strict self-imposed 
segregation from the outside world shrouds the Romani world in impenetrable mystery, 
subjecting it to suspicion and myth.   
Elaborating on how “gypsiness” is an “ascribed identity,” Tierney (2000) writes 
that the “characterization as ‘Gypsies’ of musicians, wooden spoon and wooden trough 
carvers, brush makers, blacksmiths, coppersmiths, horse traders, smallholders, bear 
trainers, beggars and a host of other occupational groups living in, or moving between, 
numerous European countries with which they had been associated for varying lengths 
of time, and speaking a startling variety of languages and dialects . . . doesn’t 
correspond with the Gypsies’ view of themselves” (179).   These characterizations, 
made by gadje, play a major role in labeling who is a Gypsy.  Even in a modern, 
capitalistic society, Roma refuse wage-labor employment, engaging instead in various 
nonindustrial self-employment.  Wage-labor is seen as a temporary situation or the last 
act of desperation.  The dominant society views the Romani refusal to slip into the 9-to-
5 rut of the proletariat as backwards and an outright defiance of normal social standards.   
The strands of difference based on physical attributes, language, attitudes, 
beliefs, rituals, morals, and self-imposed boundary maintenance have, throughout 
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history, created distinct Romani enclaves within the host population.  The Roma have 
precariously negotiated boundaries through the processes of protective self-isolation or 
assimilation/ethnic mimicry.  The latter involves unraveling those strands of difference 
only to stitch a new identity in a strange world.  The language of their everyday life 
becomes the language of the dominant society, to use the words of Fanon (1991), “to 
speak a language is to appropriate its world and culture (21). 
The Roma community is divided across endogamous groups that differ along 
lines of religion, culture, and ethnicity.  Statistical counts of Balkan Roma are unreliable 
and underestimated.  Because Roma are considered the pariah group of society, those 
who are able (particularly those with muted anthropological features) tend to self-identify 
with higher ranked groups in their surroundings.  The practice of ethnic mimicry renders 
Romani census data insufficient.    In his work on the Roma of Yugoslavia, Vukanović 
(1963) noted “a widespread tendency among the “Gypsy population . . . to hide its real 
racial character, pretending to belong to some other Balkan ethnical group . . . which 
results in reducing the estimated number of Gypsy inhabitants” (29).  Kosovo was born 
out of ethnic identity, its very borders drawn to divide one ethnic group from another.  
Those who do not belong to the collective identity of the new nation are defined as 
“other” and thus are excluded from its citizenship.  In a nation ethnically conceived, the 
concept of “citizen” is replaced by one of “nation.”  National identity becomes ethnicized 
where the "primary loyalty" is to the dominant ethnic group (Friedman 1994).  Therefore, 
if Roma want a place in the new society – if they want to survive in the new Kosovo – 
they must become a part of the national identity.  Many Roma do so by becoming 
Albanianized, others by creating a new ethnic identity.  
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The emergence of new groups of self-identification among Roma in Kosovo has 
further complicated the collection of population data.  The UNHCR reports 
approximately 130,000 Roma in Kosovo before 1999 (Ringold 2000).  Between 1991 
and 1994, 4% of Central and Eastern Europe Roma lived in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
 
Table 3 Romani Population, 1991-94 (Thousands) 
 
 
Today the estimate varies from 20,000 to 30,000.  However, it is important to note that 
Roma can be included in the counts of Egyptians, Serbs, Albanians, Turk, and/or 
Other/s either by choice or forced assimilation.  In a region where numerical domination 
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equals political domination, some Roma were forced to change their names.    As 
Bajram Jashari11* explained: 
I think the Roma here took the surnames of the gadje because of a big pressure 
from the gadje.   Roma had to take those surnames, otherwise they would be 
expelled from where they were living and working. Because we didn’t have 
anywhere to go, we had to accept their customs and habits. 
 
Nijaz Saiti* also remarked on his family’s name change: 
 
We lived mainly with Serbs. There were no Albanians in our neighborhood.  Our 
name was Saitovich, when the Albanians came they wrote our name as Saiti.   
We stayed with that surname. 
 
While census data undersamples the Romani population, Romani NGOs and elites 
inflate the population.   William Lockwood concluded, “Half a millennium of persecution 
has given Romani culture ample opportunity to develop means to evade and mislead 
both the census taker and the would-be Gypsy scholar” (Lockwood 1993). 
The map below shows the distribution of Roma in Kosovo.  Kosovar Roma self-
identify into three groups: Ashkali, Egyptian, and Roma.  Most scholars consider 
Egyptians and Ashkali to be subgroups of Roma who lost their language and became 
Albanized.  Both groups share an affinity with the Albanians, but remain rejected by the 
Albanians (OSCE/UNHCR 2001:1).   The ethnic boundaries between the three groups 
(and their metagroups) are weak; the groups intermarry12 and do not consider each 
other to be gadje.   The emergence of new subgroups and metagroups within the 
Romani community expounds the extent to which outside forces shape ethnic identity.  
Political recognition of a particular ethnic group reshapes the group’s self-awareness 
                                                        
11 A popular Albanian surname shared, ironically, with one of the founders and commander 
of the KLA. 
12 It is extremely rare for a Roma to marry a gadje. 
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and organization, and increases identification and mobilization among unrecognized 
ethnic groups, thus promoting formation of new ethnic groups (Nagel 1994).  Despite 
the intergroup differentiation of Ashkali and Egyptians from Roma, outsiders view them 
as one group.  Surrounding populations (Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Greeks, 
Macedonians, etc.) each have a word that translates into “Gypsy,” and this is how they 
refer to all Roma.  Political actors also make little distinction between Romani groups, 
collectively referring to the Romani population in Kosovo as RAE (Roma, Ashkali, 
Egyptian).   According to Marushiakova and Popov (2001a), an understanding of the 
ethno-social and ethno-cultural features and contemporary problems of Roma in 
Southeastern Europe hinges on the consideration of two circumstances: 
 
1. Roma are a specific ethnic community that has no analog in other 
nations of Europe. They are divided into groups, sub-groups, and 
metagroups with their own special features and problems that are not 
susceptible to generalizations.   
2. The historical and cultural context of Roma in different countries is 
extremely important.  The complex histories and present day situation 
of the region differentiates it from other regions.   
 
Several factors form a basis of exceptionalism for the Roma. Most important among 
them are the lack of a solidly dispersed identity, uniform religion, collective memory or 
historical consciousness, a strong oral or written history, and a commonly accepted 
ancestral land.   Although this research uses the term “Roma” to refer to all Romani 
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groups in Kosovo, it does not imply, as will be shown, that they are a cohesive group.  
Even among the three primary groups in Kosovo (Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians), there 
are many sub-groups with differences among them.  Obviously Romani groups in 
Kosovo, having undergone centuries of forced and voluntary assimilation, do not always 
share the same religion.  Further, there is a tradition among some Roma to not speak of 
the dead.  This, combined with a low literacy rate, lack of archival materials and 
widespread racism prevents Roma from sharing their history internally and externally. 
Although it is widely accepted (though still debated) that the Roma originally come from 
India, this is a history given them by non-Roma.  Indeed, throughout many of the 
interviews utilized in this research, the Roma say that they were told from external 
sources that they come from India.  It is with these circumstances in mind that this 
research does not compare the Roma of Kosovo with those of other countries or to 
other transnational ethnicities.     
 
  
Figure 
 
Rom 
The Roma group is the oldest of Kosovo, believed to have arrived with the Ottomans in 
the 14th century.  Others arrived escaping slavery from nearby Moldova and Wallachia 
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2: Ethnic Composition of Kosovo 
(OSCE, 2005) 
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to settle among the Serbs.13  A law decree from Sultan Suleiman I, dated 1530, placed 
a special tax on “Gypsies,” separating them as the “true believers” (the Muslims) and 
“the infidels” (Christians), the latter were assigned a higher tax (Marushiakova, Popov, 
and Kenrick 2001).   Today, Roma are further divided into groups based on 
geographical location and language.  Roma are traditionally blacksmiths.  Before 1999, 
Kosovar Roma were semi-nomadic or settled in ethnic enclaves.  New metagroups are 
emerging, but the common groups are Gurbeti, Arlija, Bugurdije, Muhadjeri, Divanjoldije 
and Srpski Cigani.  The Srpski Cigani (Serbian Gypsies) are most closely settled with 
the Serbs. 
Ashkali 
 The Ashkali live in central and eastern areas of Kosovo, historically within 
Albanian communities.   They have their own political and social organizations and are 
the only group with a political party, the Democratic Party of Albanian Ashkali.  Miljaim 
Ramadani’s* self-identification is somewhat ambiguous: 
 
I am Ashkali.  I didn’t live where there were many Roma.   Roma lived in 
Moravska. I lived where Albanians lived.  Roma in Priština lived in the settlement 
across from the cemetery.   Although we didn’t live with Roma, we had very good 
relations and we lived very well with them.   We also lived well with Albanians. I 
have a document that I am Albanian since 1946 but my father and my uncle said 
we are not Albanians although we speak the Albanian language. We are Ashkali. 
 
 
Though the Ashkali claim to have arrived in the Balkans from Iran in the 4th century, 
they only emerged as a separate ethnic group after 1999, likely to separate themselves 
from the Roma and the violence directed toward them.  There is no census designation 
                                                        
13  Roma were slaves throughout the Romanian principalities until slavery was abolished 
in 1856, at which time the second migratory wave of Roma moved westward across Europe.   
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for Ashkali.   The Roma argue that the Ashkali are Roma; the Egyptians insist the 
Ashkali have been forced by the Albanians to present themselves as a new ethnic 
identity (Marushiakova and Popov 2001b).    
Egyptians 
The origins and actual existence of Kosovar Egyptians continues to be a fertile 
debate between the Romani community, NGOs, and international institutions.  The 
Romani community views the Egyptian identity as a separatist movement that weakens 
Romani unity.  Egyptians accuse the Romani community, NGOs, and international 
institutions of forced assimilation.  The Ashkali accuse the Egyptians of trying to 
assimilate them into Egyptians; likewise, the Egyptians accuse the Ashkali of 
assimilation by denying Egyptian identity.  It is a complex and accusatory situation that 
ultimately creates tension between all three Romani groups.   
Egyptians are generally blacksmiths, farmers, or musicians.  They tend to be 
settled and acculturated (Albanized) in the western part of Kosovo.   In 1974, the new 
constitution allowed for ethnic self-identification and the Egyptian movement gained 
momentum as Egyptian political and cultural organizations formed and began to protest 
for a place on the official census.  The Egyptian category was not officially added to the 
census until 1991.  In 1993, the Association of Egyptians conducted their own census in 
Kosovo and Metohija with a final tally of 120,000 Egyptians (Marushiakova and Popov 
2001a).  It is a case where one must consider the source in evaluating the count.   
Though there is historical and archeological evidence of Egyptians in the Balkans, many 
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scholars consider the Egyptian ethnicity to be another form of ethnic mimicry and an 
attempt of Roma to distance themselves from being “gypsy.”14   
 Folklore is an integral part of identity and this is especially so in the Balkans 
where myth and folklore are a powerful influence in shaping both nation and identity.   
Ignoring folklore that has been passed down from generation to generation, many 
scholars point to linguistic evidence to tell Roma their origins.   Several Roma 
interviewed mentioned learning of their Indian origins from an outside source.   Adem 
Kurezi said, “We heard the Roma came from India, and all the people are today telling 
us that Roma came from India.”*   Djemilja Alija learned through the television, “I didn’t 
know that Roma came from India. I didn’t know about that. We saw that on television.”*   
Egyptians continue to argue their Egyptian origins.  Bajram Jashari insists, “As we 
heard it, Roma came from Egypt, and the Roma were once slaves. That’s how Roma 
came to Yugoslavia. We have similarities with those people from Egypt.”* 
In Romany, there is a saying, kon mangel te kerel tumendar roburen chi shocha 
phenela tumen o chachimos pa tumare perintonde, "he who wants to enslave you will 
never tell you the truth about your forefathers.”  To deny self-identification or reduce it to 
ethnic mimicry is to give all Roma an “immutable character” that they allegedly acquire 
at birth and to deny them “‘right of exit’ from group constraints (Hollinger 1995; Trubeta 
2005).    Refusal of Kosovar Albanians to distinguish between Romani groups allows 
Albanians and others outside the Romani community to maintain the “Gypsy” stereotype 
                                                        
14 See Z. Barany, “The Roma in Macedonia: Ethnic Politics and the Marginal Condition in a 
Balkan State,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1995, p. 517; Poulton, The Roma in 
Macedonia, p. 43. E. Marushiakova and V. Popov, “Myth as Process,” in Thomas Acton, ed., 
Scholarship and the Gypsy Struggle. Commitment in Romani Studies (Hatﬁeld, Hertfordshire: 
University of Hertfordshire Press, 2000), pp. 81–93. 
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without differentiating between groups or giving them a chance to rise from their 
marginalized social status.   Isak Avdo’s** comments illustrate how Albanians respond 
to Romani self-identification: 
“They can call themselves whatever they want: but when Albanians call them, 
they don’t say ‘Hey, Ashkalija,’ or ‘Hey, Egyptian, come here.’ They say ‘Hey, 
Madjup15 come here.’” 
 
In Kosovo, within the current political context, a Rom is either an Albanian or not 
an Albanian.  The latter category relies heavily on the color of a Rom’s skin and facial 
features.  There can be no in between for Roma in Kosovo.  Explosive nationalist 
conflict and crisis has left little room for neutral actors (Trubeta 2005).  Ultimately, self-
identification has little, if any, bearing on Roma in Kosovo.  It is the State, in this case 
the Albanian dominated Kosovo state, which dictates identity.  The state is thus a 
powerful “identifer,” not because it can create “identities,” but because it has the 
material and symbolic resources to impose and enforce categories of identity to which 
non-State actors must refer (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).   For Roma it is a double-
edged sword of identity, they not only lose the right to self-identify, but they are also 
forced to adhere to categories of identification assigned to them by others.   Ironically, 
the Albanians, who have become Kosovars, are refusing the Roma the same national 
status as Kosovars.   To Albanians, thus to Kosovo, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians 
remain madjusp.   
                                                        
15 Albanian word for “Gypsy” 
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Roma under the Third Reich  
“With respect to the extermination of antisocial forms of life, Dr. Goebbels is of 
the opinion that the Jews and the Gypsies should simply be exterminated.” 
Nazi Reichsminister of Justice Otto Thierack, September 14th, 1942(Whalen July 
2003)(Whalen July 2003)(Whalen July 2003) 
 
“The Gypsies had been murdered in a proportion similar to the Jews: 
about 80% of them in the area of the countries which were occupied by 
the Nazis.” 
Simon Wiesenthal, in a letter to Elie Wiesel, December 14th, 1984  
 
Although the time frame for this research focuses on the time of Tito to the 
present, an overview of the Partisan movement and the genocide of Roma under the 
Nazis in Yugoslavia is directly relevant to the region’s turbulent history and its present 
situation.  Dennis Reinhartz reminds us of the importance of acknowledging significant 
events of the Romani past to hopefully obtain a “clearer discernment of their present” 
(cited in Kenrick 2006:95).  Influenced by policies of racial hatred, Nazism in Yugoslavia 
gave license to a genocidal slaughter of Roma.    Perhaps more than any other region 
of Nazi occupation, Roma were systematically “disposed of” by mass shootings and 
mobile gas chambers, particularly in retaliation for the deaths of German troops at the 
hands of Partisans.  The Partisans, mobilized under Tito, would not only form the new 
government of Yugoslavia after the war, but their legacy would forge a central memory 
in nationalistic ideology for the next half-century.    
On March 25, 1941, under pressure from Hitler and surrounded by Axis countries, 
Prince Paul of Yugoslavia reluctantly signed the Tripartite Pact.   Serbian officers were 
outraged at what amounted to their government’s betrayal and, with backing from 
Britain, overthrew the government the following night.  Churchill proclaimed that the 
Yugoslav nation had “found its soul,” calling the coup a patriotic movement of “a valiant 
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and warlike race at the betrayal of their country by the weakness of their rulers and the 
foul intrigues of the Axis Powers.”  “Cherish the hope,” Churchill enthusiastically 
continued, while promising British aid to the new government (Churchill and Gilbert 
1999:408).  On the streets, Serbs gathered and exuberantly shouted, "Bolje rat nego 
pakt! Bolje grob nego rob!" ("Better war than pact! Better graves than slaves!").   Hitler 
was furious, making a promise of his own – to punish Belgrade and the Serbs.  In a 
victory speech the following summer, Hitler recalled: 
We were all stunned by that coup, carried through by a handful of bribed 
conspirators who had brought about the event that caused the British Prime 
Minister to declare in joyous words that at last he had something good to report. 
You will understand, gentlemen, that when I heard this I at once gave orders to 
attack Yugoslavia. To treat the German Reich in this way is impossible. 
(Copeland, Lamm, and McKenna 1999:478) 
 
 
On March 27, 1941 under Directive 25, aptly called Fall Strafe  (Operation 
Punishment), Hitler ordered Belgrade “to be destroyed by continuous day and night 
attacks of the Luftwaffe” (Domarus and Hitler 1990:2387).  On April 6, 1941, Germany’s 
12th Army advanced into Yugoslavia.  By April 12, Serbia was under the quisling 
government of Milan Aćimović.  In August, the Serbian government was reorganized as 
the puppet Government of National Salvation and Aćimović was replaced with Yugoslav 
Army General and Nazi loyalist Milan Nedić.  As a World War I war hero and Serb 
politician, Germany expected Nedić would calm the Serbs and subdue the Partisans.  
The plan only served to fuel resistance.  Once again, Hitler was faced with the 
nationalist pride of the rebellious Serb resistance.   
On September 6, Hitler issued a reprisal decree that for every German killed, 100 
Serb civilians would be shot; for every German wounded, 50 Serb civilians would be 
 48 
shot. German forces did not waste time applying the new law.  In October, the Serbian 
Volunteer Command entered the Serb town of Kragujevac and carried out one of the 
most brutal massacres of World War II.  In retaliation for a Partisan and Chetnik attack 
near Kragujevac that killed ten German soldiers and wounded twenty-six more, the Serb 
Volunteer Corp rounded up civilians for execution, including 300 secondary school 
students and their teachers.   The executions lasted two days, October 20 and October 
21.  The German command reported 2,326 executed.  It took the survivors four days to 
bury the dead.   
On October 26, 1941, General Harald Turner issued order number 44/41, 
specifying that Jews and Roma should be the primary targets of retaliation.   He further 
stated: 
The Gypsy cannot, by reason of his inner and outer makeup, be a useful member 
of international society … As a matter of principle it must be said that the Jews 
and Gypsies represent an element of insecurity and thus a danger to public order 
and safety.  It is the Jewish intellect that has brought on this war and that has to 
be destroyed.  Gypsies, on account of their inner and outer disposition, cannot be 
useful members of the family of nations.  It has been established that the Jewish 
element plays an important part in the leadership of the bands and that Gypsies 
in particular are responsible for special atrocities and intelligence.  That is why it 
is a matter of principle in each case to put all Jewish men and all male Gypsies at 
the disposal of troops as hostages.  (NA, NOKW-802, 26 October 1941; 
Nuremberg DocumentsRights June 28 2005) 
 
In a report on the shooting of Jews and Gypsies, Lieutenant Walther, head of the 
execution squad, complained that digging the graves was most time consuming as the 
“shooting itself goes quickly (100 men in forty minutes).”  Of the Roma, he added: 
The shooting of Jews is simpler than that of the Gypsies. It must be admitted that 
the Jews are very cool in the death - they are very quiet - while the Gypsies cry, 
shout and move constantly when they are already on the shooting place. Some 
even jumped off the volley into the pit and tried to play dead (Walther 2004:121) 
 
 Photo 2: Roma walking to their execution
A Serbian gendarme serving the Serbian puppet government led by Milan Nedi
of Roma to their execution.  
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of 
 
 
In 1942, Schutzstaffel Officer 
Löhr in which he itemized the accomplishments of the previous administration.  He 
wrote, “Serbia only country in which Jewish questi
NOKW-1486, 29 August 1942; Nuremberg Documents 2002
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Muzej Revolucije Narodnosti Jugoslavije.
Turner drafted a report for the new Generaloberst 
on and Gypsy question solved” 
).   
 
, escorts a group 
 
(NA, 
Photo 3
Courtesy Deutsches Historisches Museum.
 
Some Roma managed to survive the shootings and avoid the camps by hiding or 
joining the Partisans.   Reili Mettbach was eight years old when her family fled Germany 
in 1939.  Himmler’s Decree for 
Required by the Nature of Race
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: Retaliatory execution in Pancevo, Serbia 
 
Basic Regulations to Resolve the Gypsy Question as 
, issued December 8 of 1938, finalized the “Gypsy 
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problem” as one of race and set the stage for annihilation of the Romani people across 
Europe.  The waves of deportations and arrests of Roma quickly followed.  Reili’s family 
went first to Yugoslavia.  When the Germans invaded Yugoslavia they fled to Romania.  
As the Germans invaded Romania and Hungary, her family fled once again, this time to 
Bulgaria.  When the Germans invaded Bulgaria, Reili’s family returned to Yugoslavia.  
Faced with shooting squads or camps, her family learned to hide.  Reili, like many 
young Roma in Yugoslavia, became a messenger for Tito’s Partisans.  
They picked me to bring the message there because I could speak Yugoslavian.  
And I blended in with the Yugoslavian kids: I was dark, skinny, barefooted, 
raggedy.  Who would pay attention to a kid?  And they said to walk on the 
railroad tracks so I don’t get lost . . . And I walked down the railroad tracks.  It 
was late evening.  There was woods on one side.  And on the poles where the 
telephone wires went, they had three or four Yugoslavians.  Partisans.  Hung 
them.  And when I walked, I saw the legs and looked up.  They already hung 
there three or four days.  (Sonneman 2002:98) 
 
Reili’s family hid in a farmhouse with two other families.  It was four o’clock in the 
morning when the police stormed the farmhouse and forced all three families into a 
truck.  “Everybody was crying and screaming and the kids were crying too because the 
mother cried.  And we knew it was bad, bad, that we had to go in the bad camp” 
(Sonneman 2002:99).  Reili’s family was sent first to Ravensbrück and then to a forced 
labor camp on the Yugoslavian border.  Her father was sent away to the men’s camp 
and her mother sent to work in the kitchen.  Reili and her cousins were placed with the 
other children and forced to work in a rock quarry day after day, each blurring into a 
year and a half of internment. 
There was no Sunday.  There was no winter day.  In the winter-time they give 
you thin clothing, just for the meanness of it.  They give you wooden clogs, if they 
fit or if they didn’t fit.  You just followed orders.  You didn’t say were [sic] too 
weak.  You got beaten, you got hurt, you got taken away.  You just don’t say, “I 
don’t feel good, I’m tired, I don’t want to
followed orders.  You made no waves.  
 
Reili is on the first row on far right with her extended family in 1938.  The man in the 
middle in the plaid jacket is her uncle Eduard, who was killed in 
collection of Dr. Ludwig Eiber.  Reprint from Toby Sonneman.
 
It is also during Nazi occupation that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was dissolved 
and carved amongst Germany and her allies.  Most of Kosovo was annexed from 
Serbia into Italian controlled Albania, fostering the idea of  “Greater Albania.”  As the 
Turks did in 1389, the Italians (and Germans after capitulation) encouraged Albanians 
to move into Kosovo, pushing the Serbs out as they did.   The success of such 
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, I’m homesick, I’m still a child.”  You 
(Sonneman 2002:101) 
Photo 4: Reili Mettbach 
Dachau.  Photo from 
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encouragement is stunningly clear in a 1942 statement issued by Kosovo Albanian 
leader, Ferat-bey Draga, "the time has come to exterminate the Serbs . . . there will be 
no Serbs under the Kosovo sun" (Bajrami 1983:313).   In Kosovo, as with much of 
Yugoslavia, World War II incited violent civil wars between Chetniks, Partisans, German 
and Italian forces, and the ethnic Albanians.  The majority of Albanians were aligned 
with the Germans and Italians.   
The Roma of Kosovo fared better than those in the rest of Yugoslavia.  Why this 
is so is not particularly clear, but evidence points to a high number of Roma Partisans in 
Kosovo and the surrounding mountains (Crowe 2007; Guy 2001; Kenrick 2006).  It is 
also likely that Albanian hatred of ethnic Serbs, encouraged by old animosities, 
overshadowed ill will toward the Roma.  The Italians were not as enthusiastic about the 
Nazi pogroms and often refused to enforce deportations and executions.  That is not to 
say the Roma in Kosovo escaped Nazi persecution entirely.   Germany reoccupied 
Kosovo in 1943 when the Italians surrendered to the allies.  Himmler’s infamous 
Skanderbeg Division, made up primarily of Albanian Muslim nationalists, was not so 
sympathetic.16   The Division’s goal was to create an ethnically pure “Albania” of Kosovo 
and southern Serbia.  The result would be a deepening of the division between 
Albanians and non-Albanians.  During the post-war tribunals, the Skanderberg 
Brigadeführer, August Schmidthuber, was found guilty of atrocities against civilians and 
sentenced to death - an outcome that would replay itself fifty-two years later against 
Serb leaders.  
                                                        
16 Himmler had previously recruited troops from Balkan Muslims with assistance from the 
Grand Mufti, Haj Amin el-Husseini.  For recent work on the Arab-Nazi relationship see Herf, 
Jeffrey. 2009. Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World. New Haven, Conn; London. 
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Because records of mass murders are largely non-existent or were destroyed, 
the number of Roma victims is not known.  It is estimated that two-thirds of Yugoslav 
Roma were exterminated during World War II.  The Romani Holocaust, or O Baro 
Porrajmos (The Great Devouring) as it is called in Romany, is the Forgotten Holocaust.    
The lack of census data on Roma before the war, the random rampages of the 
Einsatzgrüppen, and the absence of death records ensure no researcher can claim 
accurate numbers of Romani deaths, despite their many attempts to escalate and to 
minimize the toll.  All of the conditions above allow revisionists to continue to write out 
the suffering of the Roma or group them as “other” victims of the Holocaust.  All too 
often the debate becomes one of who suffered more when it should be enough that 
suffering existed.   At the 1987 conference of the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Council, Erika Thurner emphasized the consequences of historical neglect of the 
Porrajmos: 
Ignorance as to the fate of the Sinti and Roma in the Third Reich has made 
historical reconstruction especially difficult.  It has led to further discrimination 
against Gypsies, and to the refusal to recognize their right to restitution of both a 
material and ideal nature. (7)  
 
Romani scholars have a responsibility to the memory and to the present relevance of 
the Porrajmos.  Therefore they must, at every opportunity, work to correct history in 
order to shed light on the present.   
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The Golden Man 
 
“One happy day, a new (true) Yugoslav constitution may open with the following 
words: In our country all memories are equal.” 
Bogdan Bogdanović  
 
Unlike other countries that were liberated by Allied powers, Yugoslavia rid itself 
of the Axis.  Yugoslavia’s self-liberation excluded the country from Stalin’s collection of 
vassal states.  The pride of this self-liberation laid the foundation for a new Yugoslavia 
built upon a fierce Yugoslav nationalism.  As commander of the victorious Partisan army 
and leader of the Communist Party, Josep Broz Tito became the de facto leader of the 
new Yugoslavia. He constituted the country as a federal republic consisting of six 
constituent republics, largely divided along ethnic lines: Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia.  Kosovo and Vojvodina, highly 
populated with non-Slavs, were granted autonomous provincial status.    Under the 
control of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), autonomy was more temporary 
appeasement than permanent practice.     
So popular was Tito’s political and socio-economic success that Soviet leaders 
held him up as a role model for others to follow.   In fact, the Cominform, the official 
organization of the international Communist movement, was initially seated in Belgrade.  
However, in the spring of 1948, Tito, a leader rather than a follower, made a bold move 
that surprised Stalin and the West.   After effectively neutralizing the minority of 
comniformists within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), Tito stood up to Stalin 
and withdrew from the Eastern Bloc.  The separation from Stalin is more complicated 
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than time allows for this paper, but most relevant was the unfettered development of a 
new form of socialism that would come to be called Titoism. 
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform was made official on June 28, 1948, 
St. Vitus, a day that is repeatedly etched in Yugoslav nationalism.17  Djilas would recall: 
. . .its promulgation on the anniversary of the traffic battle in 1389 as Kosovo, 
which had inaugurated five centuries of Turkish rule over the Serbian people, cut 
into the minds and hearts of all Serbs.  Though neither religious nor mystical, we 
noted with a certain relish almost, the coincidence in dates between ancient 
calamities and living threats and onslaughts (1985:201). 
 
Stalin threatened Tito with invasion, made various attempts at internal coups, instigated 
border clashes, and flooded Yugoslavia with propaganda.   He reportedly told 
Khrushchev, "I will shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito.  He will fall” 
(1976:62).  Though his tactics proved useless, Stalin would spend the remaining five 
years of his life purging Titoism in areas under his control, including popular Communist 
leaders such as Hungarian László Rajk, Bulgarian Traycho Kostov, and Czech Rudolf 
Slánský.  Tito never waivered in his boldness, sending a note to Stalin that read:  "Stop 
sending people to kill me. We've already captured five of them, one of them with a bomb 
and another with a rifle (...) If you don't stop sending killers, I'll send one to Moscow, and 
I won't have to send a second" (Sebag Montefiore 2003:647).18 
                                                        
17 It was the day of the 1389 famous Battle of Kosovo; the assassination of Archduke 
Ferdinand; the constitutional founding of the first Yugoslavia; the day of Milošević’s 
infamous battle speech; and, ironically, also the date Milošević was sent to The Hague on 
charges of war crimes. 
18 The note was allegedly found hidden in a newspaper in Stalin’s desk after his death, 
along with a letter from Lenin demanding an apology for Stalin’s rudeness to his wife and 
the infamous Bukharin final plea.  Recent scholars question the legitimacy of these letters, 
citing they are anti-communist revisionist fabrications. See (Herf 2009) 
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 Tito turned to the West.  Quick to cooperate with any country that rejected 
Stalinism and hopeful of the Yugoslav experiment, the West granted Tito trade 
agreements, treaties, and poured loans and grants into Yugoslavia’s growing economy.  
By 1955, the United States had given $598.5 million in economic aid and $588.5 million 
in military aid to Yugoslavia (Campbell and Council on Foreign Relations. 1967:29).  
After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev’s conciliatory and apologetic gestures toward Tito led 
to the signing of the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations and an eventual 
rapprochement between the two states and the differing Communist Parties.   The 
Soviet Union would no longer dictate Marxist interpretation to other socialist countries. 
Tito, a “convinced Marxist but no student or servant of doctrine” (Campbell 1980:1055), 
reinterpreted Marx-Leninsim in a most unique way by combining it with democratic 
capitalism.  Politically savvy and charismatic, Tito played the game well, winning the 
adoration of the West.  A well-liked communist, Tito stood high on the world stage, an 
image larger than his little country warranted, with one foot in the West and the other in 
the Bloc.   It was a balance he would maintain well throughout the Cold War.   
 
  
It would be a mistake to say that nationalism did not exist under Tito in 
Yugoslavia.  Although certainly more subtle than the nationalism 
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Photo 5: Tito with Churchill 
that would dominate 
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the 1990’s, Tito meticulously orchestrated the creation of the Yugoslav national 
consciousness in his campaign of Bratstvo i Jedinstvo, Brotherhood and Unity.    A 
modern nation cannot exist without national consciousness that manifests itself in an 
awareness of group membership and that membership is inherently valuable (Hroch 
2000:12).  From the beginning, Tito rallied his people first around the recent memory of 
the common goal of liberation, and second around a Marxist socialist liberation from 
oppression.  With impressive charisma and persuasion, Tito emphasized the urgency of 
Yugoslav unity during a speech held at the Slovene Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
“Concerning the National Question and Social Patriotism” in 1948: 
The reason why we were able to settle the nationalities question so thoroughly is 
to be found in the fact that it had begun to be settled in a revolutionary way in the 
course of the Liberation War, in which all the nationalities in the country 
participated, in which every national group made its contribution to the general 
effort of liberation from the occupier according to its capabilities.  (1963:99) 
 
Tito’s partisans had truly been the only non-segregated, multiethnic military force 
during World War II.  This common history, a valiant battle, served as the prologue to a 
new multiethnic, liberated Yugoslavia.   Indeed, the role of Tito’s partisans as liberators 
continues to dominate the collective memory as an historical point of reference and 
legitimacy of the communist era.   Ludanyi (1979) labeled the pervasion of the partisan 
legacy the ”Partisan Myth,” and argued it was designed with the purposes of ensuring 
the leading role of the Communists and to self-define the nationalities of Yugoslavia 
according to a common destiny (238).   The identity of Yugoslavs as well as the basis 
for its leadership was entirely dependent upon national history, legacy and myth.  
Simply put, the people of Yugoslavia, shell-shocked and seeking a savior believed 
everything and forgot everything.  
 60 
Tito argued that a socialist patriotism is international and therefore cannot be 
construed as nationalism.  When confronted with the nationalist question, Tito 
responded, “We are nationalists to the exact degree necessary to develop a healthy 
socialist patriotism among our people, and socialist patriotism is in its essence 
internationalism” (1963:105).  “Patriotism” required assurance that no ethnic group had 
more power than another.   Tito firmly placed the burden of past oppression upon the 
“great-Serb capitalist clique” of old Yugoslavia.   It was in line with weakening that clique 
and former Serbian power (and Albanian concessions) that Tito initially separated 
Kosovo and Vojvodina from “Serbia proper,” granting them each autonomy, a situation 
that would increasingly frustrate and anger Serbs.  After the July 1966 removal of 
Aleksandar Ranković, a top Serbian leader, vice-president of Yugoslavia and head of 
state intelligence, the proposition that Tito’s regime was “purposely anti- Serbian grew 
more tenable” (Miller 2000:272).19  The sacrifice of Serbian territories in the name of 
equality, as well as the purging of Serb officials, placed Yugoslavia on a fault line that 
would eventually contribute to the break up Tito’s legacy.   Indeed, methods of 
ethnofederalism inevitably lead to partition and a highly politicized ethnic nationalism.  
At the collapse of communism, the three existing ethnofederalized systems – 
Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia – broke apart, all along ethnic lines.  
   Unlike other communist countries, Tito did not take an assimilationist approach 
to deal with the various ethnicities of Yugoslavia.  While other eastern European 
countries, Hungary for example, applied the assimilationist formula of “(Gypsy) + 
(Socialist Wage-labor) + (Housing) = (Hungarian Worker) + (Gypsy Folklore)” (Stewart 
                                                        
19 For an analysis of the significance of Ranković’s dismissal see Voyles. 1966. "The removal 
of Rankovic; an early interpretation of the July Yugoslav Party plenum." RAND Corporation.   
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1990), the Yugoslav “key” ensured proportionate representation of minorities and 
national groups at all levels of the government.  Minorities had the right to official use of 
their own language, including in educational institutions, and the right to establish and 
maintain their own cultural practices and associations.  State aid was made available for 
the creation and distribution of minority newspapers, publication of books, maintenance 
of theaters, libraries, folklore groups, and choirs (Shoup 1963:74).  Not only was 
Yugoslavia leading other socialist countries in terms of economic growth, living 
standards, consumer goods, and personal freedoms, it also lacked the social problems 
of race and gender that heated the West.  As Richard West so succinctly puts it, “there 
was socialism but not much sociology in Yugoslavia” (1995:338).  
According to the census, “brotherhood and unity” had an impact on self-
identification as a “Yugoslav.”  Between the 1971 and 1981 censuses in Yugoslavia, the 
number of individuals who declared Yugoslav identity increased from 273,077 to 
1,219,024 (Burg and Berbaum 1989:535).  Those identifying as “Romi/Gypsies” more 
than doubled.  There is little doubt that Roma still counted themselves among the 
Yugoslavs as well as other ethnic identities, but for the first time in their very long history 
Roma officially identified themselves as Roma and held all the rights of full citizenship.   
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Table 4: Estimated 1981 Population Changes 
 
 
 
The Roma Remember 
Several themes emerged out of interviews with Roma, but one sentiment was 
unmistakably present:  Roma had a better quality of life under Tito.  Every Roma 
interviewed by various sources held an unwavering and emotional sense of Titoist 
nostalgia.  Interviewees spoke of improvement of life, the right to education, the right to 
employment, and sincere admiration for Tito.  Their sense of freedom was frequently 
mentioned and measured in the very basic ability to walk along the streets without 
harassment.  
Djemalj Kajtazi* was born in 1922 in Priština.  Djemalj grew up in a small shack 
made of mud and tree branches.  It wasn’t until Tito came, Djemalj recalled, “and freed 
Yugoslavia did “poor Roma start to live better.”  When Tito was in power, Djemalj 
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worked in the hospital as a cleaner and porter.  He stated that he never had any 
problems with “Serbs or anyone else all the time while Tito was in power.”  He worked 
and the money that he earned had value.   Everyone worked, Djemalj reminisced, “not 
like now.  I am not useful for anything; I can’t work now.” 
Nadzija Gradina* also pointed out the value of money in Tito’s time, “When Tito 
came to power, we could buy a lot of things that the small amount of money. Money 
was worth a lot then, and you could buy what you wanted. We had enough money in 
Tito’s time.”  The daughter of a blacksmith, Nadzija lived and worked the fields in 
harmony with the Serbs and Albanians during Tito’s years.  Her husband held a state 
factory job and she remembers that his salary allowed them to live “a good life.” 
“A good life.”  It is a phrase spoken often by Roma who lived under Tito’s brand 
of communism.  The good life, for the Roma, was not contingent upon fancy cars, 
jewels, or even homes of brick; instead, it meant electricity, radio, and bread.  Miljaim 
Ramadani* is an Ashkali born in Priština.  He doesn’t know how old he is because his 
father did not register his birth, but he believes he is seventy-six.  Miljaim worked in the 
factories for thirty years.  He recalled the ease of those years:  “We lived very well in 
Tito’s time. Roma and Ashkali had a very good life. We had electricity in Tito’s time. We 
can indulge ourselves and buy a television set, radio, and better things for the house. 
We lived better.” 
Nijaz Saiti* grew up amongst Serbs in Priština. A survivor of World War II, Nijaz 
joined the Communist party in 1950 and eagerly took part in voluntary work gangs.  He 
lamented how it has been forgotten that Roma helped to rebuild the country after World 
War II.  Later he worked as a house painter for the army and then for the Angropromet 
 64 
supermarket.  Nijaz reflected on life under Tito: “I lived well too when Tito was in charge 
of this country. I was on many commissions.  I lived well and I had a good salary.  We 
had everything.”  Najiz added a message to young Roma to go to school despite the 
difficulty Roma face in the educational system and the violence from other students.  
Again, he turns to the past: “Everyone who wanted could find a job or go to school.  Life 
was better then.  We had freedom; nobody touched us.” 
Ahmet Mehmeti* echoed Najiz’s comments about availability of work:  
“Everybody who wanted to work could find a job. There were as many jobs as you 
wanted, as your heart wanted. Nobody asked you about your education you apply for a 
job then. I have 26 years of work service because I wanted to work.”  Ahmet held that 
harmony existed among all when Marshall Tito was alive.  After Tito’s death, friendships 
disappeared, “there is a very big cold between people,” and it is “like a family without a 
head of household.”  He recalled that his family got along well with both Serbs and 
Albanians, but “that good time has passed.” 
For many Roma interviewed, it was not only harmony between ethnicities in 
Kosovo that made their lives easier, but also mutual respect.  Respect seems to have 
significant value in how Roma refer to their Serb or Albanian neighbors in the past.  
They often say that it did not matter that they were “Gypsies” when they had respect. 
Bajram Demiri*, for example, recalls:  “In ex-Yugoslavia we were respected by Serbs 
and Albanians. We were gypsies but it didn’t matter; they wanted us because we were 
brushing their shoes then. They gave us what to eat because they said we roam over 
not bothering anyone, that we were not making any problem for anyone.”  Sabedin 
Musliu**, a Muslim Roma, reflected on how peaceful interethnic relations were, 
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“Everybody lived together then- Albanians, Turks, Ashkalija and Roma. It was very 
peaceful; in that time Tito ruled us, and everything was okay.”   
 
 
Photo 6: Sabedin Musliu 
Courtesy of Balkan Project 
 
 
Riza Dukich* is Kovachi Roma20 from the village of Dobrotina.  Riza voluntarily 
joined the Partisans in 1942, where he served “marching for Tito” until 1947.  Riza lost 
many of his friends on the front.  He speaks fondly of respect and of freedom, another 
theme woven throughout Roma interviews: 
Roma started to live a little bit better when freedom came. Roma started to work 
in state-owned factories. Roma had to eat. Children were going to schools, and 
life started to be better for Roma. Tito made all that possible for Roma. For the 
first time, we had salaries; we could build better houses; we were getting credits 
and we were filling our houses with furniture. It was much better for us then.   I 
work in a factory. There were no problems with anyone. No one told you that you 
                                                        
20 Kovachi Roma are blacksmiths. 
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were Rom. Nobody underestimated you. It was respect between people, and 
poor people started to climb up the ladder. It wasn’t like before. 
 
 
Though there is a tendency of politicians to paint Roma as wanderers, eastern 
European Roma are typically not those one may imagine in a “gypsy wagon” roaming 
the countryside.  The nomadic myth of Roma is at once symbolic of a freedom many 
wish to have, yet demonized as irresponsible and selfishly bohemian.  In other words, to 
long for such freedom is perfectly acceptable, to act upon it, however, is criminal.  
Indeed, throughout all of Europe legislation has existed for hundreds of years that 
criminalizes and/or ghettoizes Roma that do caravan.  The problem then occurs that 
when Roma do travel, nomadic or not, they are seen as criminals particularly as they 
travel as a rather large family.   
Zufa Shalja* talks often of freedom during her interview.  Originally from Peč, 
Zufa lived four years in a cave during World War II, hiding from the Germans.  Today 
she sells goods that cure children of their fears and spells.  She says she cannot reveal 
the secret of how she cures them because someone taught her.  She has ten children 
and “fifty or sixty grandchildren.”  She misses the freedom to travel she once had: 
We lived well in Tito’s time. We were rich: we had it all. And nobody bothered us.  
We could sleep even under the open sky. I slipped out with my family. We were 
free to sleep out. I traveled a lot to Italy, and we didn’t have a room to sleep in, 
we slept under a bridge. We were big group. We were about 20, and nobody 
bothered us. But today we can’t go anywhere.  
 
 
The daughter of Partisans, Ljubica Stankovich* spent three months of her 
childhood interred in the Sajmište concentration camp during World War II.  Naturally, 
the first sentiment she recalls having after the war was of freedom.  She had very little in 
her childhood, much under Tito, and now has returned to a loss of freedom – “You could 
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move freely.  You could sleep on the street and nobody would touch you.  And now, you 
can’t even walk freely on the street.”   
Radmila Djordjevich* comes from a family of musicians.  The Germans executed 
her father and brother.  She remembers well bodies hanging in the square during the 
war.  On the first day of liberation, she recalls at once feeling freedom.  Like Ljubica, 
Radmill remembers she could walk outside and no one would touch her. “We could 
even sleep out then, on the benches, anywhere we wanted.  Nobody dared to touch us 
then.  Nobody was touching anybody then.  That feeling was so good; I felt joy inside 
my soul, as if I was reborn.” 
Tito’s death hit the Roma especially hard.  To Roma who had survived the 
horrors of fascism, Tito had brought freedom and prosperity.  For all Roma, life under 
Tito offered education, employment, freedom to travel, and respect – even for “Gypsies.”  
The words of Radmila Djordjevich* express well the general sentiment of many Roma 
upon Tito’s death and the years that followed: 
The day Tito died the whole world was crying.  We lost something very important 
in the world.  We haven’t had such freedom since.  Everything was slowly ruined 
until we came to the minimum . . . All was lost with Tito. 
 
 
When Tito died, the Romani place would be ineluctably returned to a position that was 
little better than that during the bloody years of Hitler and the fascist gangs that roamed 
and hunted the villages of Yugoslavia.  Tito took with him the only stability the Romani 
people had ever known.   
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Divide and Conquer 
Balkanize |ˈbôlkəˈnīz| 
verb [ trans. ] 
1. to divide (a country, territory, etc.) into small, quarrelsome, ineffectual states. 
2. to divide (groups, areas, etc.) into contending and usually ineffectual factions: a 
movement to balkanize minority voters. 
          Collins English Dictionary 
 
The Balkans was never the powder-keg but just one of a number of devices 
which might have acted as detonator. The powder-keg was Europe itself. 
          Misha Glenny (1999) 
 
The ethnic wars that would soon rage across the country and splinter her borders 
should have come as no surprise to anyone that was paying attention.  Indeed, as the 
nation mourned the loss of her grandfather politicians and diplomats gathered at his 
funeral to discuss and debate her future.  Assuming that Tito had held together 
Yugoslavia’s multi-ethnic “brotherhood and unity,” predictions of civil war and the 
demise of Yugoslavia dominated the primary talking points at the leader’s funeral.   Why 
would world leaders, so early on, predict the dissolution of Yugoslavia?   More 
importantly, how could they predict civil war in a country that was, at that time, a 
socioeconomically sound model federation?  Did Tito’s death indeed unfreeze “hoary 
national sentiments” as Liebich (1998) asserted, or were other forces at work?   
In this section I intend to consider the questions above in order to explore the 
contributing factors that turned Bratstvo i Jedinstvo into a virulent nationalism, made 
enemies of neighbors, and left the Roma deeply despised by all.  I will argue that the 
flames of nationalism were fueled by external opportunism in a country made vulnerable 
by regime change.  Further, it was not the “ancient hatreds” of Yugoslavs, particularly 
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the Albanians and Serbs, that incited violence, but racist balkanophobia, greed, and 
imperialism of the West.  I will also contend that the subsequent and tragic situation of 
the Roma was fostered by the neglect of international organizations and a history that 
essentially morally anaesthetized the people of Kosovo and government agencies to 
their plight.  I will demonstrate how rising nationalist ideologies, manipulated by external 
forces, adhere to the process of nation-building and nationalism according to the theory 
triangulation presented earlier in Table 1.   
Though the collapse of authoritarian rule has the potential to render states 
particularly prone to violence, it would be a simplistic and weak explanation to blame the 
ethnic violence of Kosovo (and Yugoslavia in general) on the death of Tito.21  To be 
sure, “ancient hatreds” did exist in the region, but the West played a major role in fueling 
their fires. In order to shed light on the nationalism and violence that dominated the 
period after Tito’s death, it is important to consider how the western view of the Balkans 
has historically been seeped in racial stereotypes.  Andrej Grubačić, a libertarian 
socialist deeply inspired by the work of Staughton Lynd and the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee, demonstrates throughout his numerous essays on the demise 
of Yugoslavia that Western views of the Balkans are racist at their very core, manifested 
through imperialist opportunism and a Western “othering” of the Balkan people.  
Grubačić recalls the view of Western commentators, particularly one British journalist: 
The ferocity of the Balkan peoples has at times been so primitive that 
anthropologists have likened them to the Amazon’s Yanamamo, one of the 
world’s most savage and primitive tribes.  Up until the turn of the present century, 
when the rest of Europe was concerned as much with social etiquette as with 
social reform, there were still reports from the Balkans of decapitated enemy 
                                                        
21 For support of this statement see the work of Hodson, Sekulić, and Massey (1994); Cohen 
(1995); Denitch (1994); Silber and Little (1996); and Woodward (1995). 
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heads presented as trophies on silver plates at victory dinners.  Nor was it 
unknown for the winners to eat the loser’s heart and liver . . . The history books 
show it as a land of murder and revenge before the Turks arrived and long after 
they departed (2007b:124). 
 
 
The term “Balkan,” Turkish for a “chain of wooded mountains,” first referred to the 
mountain chain that runs from Bulgaria to the Black sea and divided the area into 
smaller regions.  The mountain chain acted as a geographical barrier that divided 
various ethnic groups and shaped a cultural landscape that attached social groups to 
the territorial divisions and created the symbolic notion of a nation.  The landscape and 
the accompanying concept of nation became linked to a national history, thus 
embodying “national spirit” and “national characteristics,” such as honesty, sobriety, 
modesty, strength, love of freedom, solidarity, and steadfastness that developed as a 
result of a harsh mountain life (Brunnbauer and Pichler 2002:79).   
 
Figure 3: The Balkan Mountain Range 
 
By the late nineteenth century, Balkan came to signify the geographical territories 
under past or continuing Ottoman control.   Geographically within Europe, but culturally 
outside of Europe, the Balkans were the “internal other” of Europe.  That which is not 
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Europe, is not civilized.  Indeed, by the twentieth century, Balkan was far from a 
geographical term, but a pejorative inextricably linked to the process of modernization 
within a number of struggling nation-states.  The struggle of those nation-states to 
modernize accompanied by excessive nationalism within their borders twisted the term 
“Balkan” into a “symbol for the aggressive, intolerant, barbarian, semi-developed, semi-
civilized, and semi-oriental” (Tordorova 2009:194).  A perfect example is the image and 
accompanying description below, found on the first page of American journalist John 
Reed’s coverage of war in Eastern Europe (1916). 
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Photo 7: Balkan Stereotype by John Reed 
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In her powerful and influential book, Imagining the Balkans, Maria Todorova 
(2009) challenges the Saidian concept of Orientalism22, with her own Balkanism.  
Todorova marks the difference between the two, apart from the obvious geographical 
concreteness, as an “imputed opposition” (Orientalism) and an “imputed ambiguity” 
(balkanism) (17-18) that is neither liminal nor marginal, but lowermost – “the shadow, 
the structurally despised alter-ego” (Schwartz-Salant and Steins 1991:40-41).  The 
Balkans lacked the European prerequisite for modernization and democratization:  “the 
ideal political order of one nation, speaking one language, ruled by one state, within one 
bounded territory” (Irvine and Gal 1999:63).  The Balkans, simply put, were too 
ethnically heterogeneous for Europe.  As Lindstrom and Razsa argue, Europe may be 
afraid to recognize how the violent origin of its own system of nation-states is reflected 
in recent Yugoslav wars, "the result of several centuries of social engineering – ethnic 
and religious war and expulsions accompanying the process of centralization – 
triggered by a fundamental hostility to heterogeneity, which in the end brought about 
relatively homogeneous politics that ‘organically’ grew into the modern nation-states" 
(Lindstrom and Razsa 1999:15).  Slavoj Žižek’s work enforces not only the myth of 
ancient hatreds among Yugoslavs, but also the way in which Yugoslavia mirrors 
Europe’s “repressed reverse:” 
                                                        
22 Many Balkan scholars have applied Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), the Western 
othering of the Orient, to the relationship between Europe and the Balkans.  For discourses 
of the Balkans and Orientalism, see Vesna Goldsworthy (1998), Andrew Hammond (2006), 
and Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden (1992). 
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The fantasy which organized the perception of ex-Yugoslavia is that of ‘Balkan’ 
as the other of the West: the place of savage ethnic conflicts long since 
overcome by civilized Europe; a place where nothing is forgotten and nothing is 
learned, where old traumas are replayed again and again; where the symbolic 
link is simultaneously devalued (dozens of cease-fires are broken) and 
overvalued (primitive warrior notions of honor and pride)… behind all this lurked 
the primordial trauma of Sarajevo, of the Balkans as the gunpowder threatening 
to set the whole of Europe alight. . . . Far from being the Other of Europe, ex-
Yugoslavia was, rather, Europe itself in its own repressed reverse. (Žižek 
1994:212) 
 
Othering is closely related to guilt alleviation.  As Brummett (2008) puts it, othering 
“alleviates imperialist guilt by casting the targeted country or group of people as savage 
and in need of Western influence” (78).  Western influence upon the others is necessary 
because they must be saved from themselves, but it also serves well to keep the 
dominant group in power.  So destructive is this notion of “other” as tied to the territory 
of Europe that Bruce Baum argues it “was itself one of the most important antecedents 
of the modern “race” concept (2006:25). 
Grubačić terms the phenomenon of a whole complex of elite (racist) reactions as 
“’political balkanophobia’: an elite fear of autonomous spaces” (2007c:l2071).  The 
crucial component of balkanophobia is debalkanization, or Eurocentric universalism.  
The ideological balkanophobic response is: 
a process of “othering” of the Balkans, in the struggle to “break the heavy mute 
spell of wilderness,” where the Balkans had became a symbol of everything 
mysterious and threatening in European culture.  The Balkans became a “wild” 
Europe, an entangling, intricate labyrinth inhabited by the creatures of sin and 
insolent nations incapable of governing themselves: a place in the heart of 
European darkness where an evil thought will carry a good man out of the light; a 
place outside, if on the doorstep, where people need to be evangelized in the 
name of civilizing missions, human rights and civil society. (Grubačić 
2007c:l2087). 
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According to Grubačić, the “deep-seated cultural derision” of the Balkan people is the 
crucial aspect of “balkanization from above,” a practice that has been "remarkably 
consistent in history, of breaking Balkan interethnic solidarity and regional socio-cultural 
identity; a process of violently incorporating the region into the system of nation-states 
and capitalist world-economy; and contemporary imposition of neoliberal colonialism" 
 (2007a:42-43).   
Racial degradation and “balkanization from above” by the West had a unifying 
effect on her people, spurring nationalistic ideologies and ethnic divisions.  Political 
Scientist Crawford Young’s (2002) study on identity politics and civil violence in Africa 
illustrates that cultural pluralism is not necessarily a prime determinant of civil violence. 
However, the coupling of armed conflict and violence compels identity to become a 
major component of patterns of confrontation, even when diverse communal 
determinants are at play (540).  Further, where ethnicity is not the cause of disorder, 
violence predictably embodies discourses of difference, specifically because “ethnicity 
armed escalates mutual fears, anxieties, and insecurities; communally targeted violence 
inscribes memories of ineffable loss of kin and fellow ethnics, and inspires dreams of 
vengeance” (556).   
Memory and vengeance were no doubt at the forefront of violence in Kosovo, but, 
as Young’s study shows, this does not necessarily imply they were the root cause.  
Years, indeed centuries of racial stereotyping and pressure to “Europeanize,” that is to 
form homogenous nation states that conformed to European ideals, propelled 
Yugoslavs, particularly Serbs, to their own strong ideals of self-preservation.  To Serbs, 
the threat to evolve into the folds of Europe or else became poignantly clear when the 
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West accepted Slovenia and Croatia’s independence.  Support for Croatia and Tudjman, 
an icon of democracy over communism, grew in the West.  In early 2000, Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright commended “Croatia’s rapid move into Europe” while 
expressing hope that the “Croatian example” will “make the Serbs think hard” (Erlinger 
February 3, 2000).   
The political redrawing of the borders of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina left 
a third of Serbs outside their republic (Mandić 2007:78).  Restrictive and selective 
sanctions served to further isolate the Serbs, while the West’s support and 
encouragement of that isolation further frustrated them.   However, these events also 
united Serbs around rising nationalistic ideologies for a single Serbian state with 
Milosević at the helm.  In a survey of post-breakup Yugoslav literature, Danilo Mandić 
noted a trend that perpetuated Serb nationalism as “an anomaly and exception in its 
unusual aggressiveness, irrationality, intolerance, aversion to multiculturalism, 
propensity for violence, expansionist tendency or general ‘backwardness’” (Mandić 
2007:16).  For example, Branimir Anzulović (1999) in Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to 
Genocide differentiates Serb nationalism from that of other Slavic people by its 
“genocidal” nature.  This type of approach, coupled with the Western media’s play on 
atavistic hatreds in the region, not only neglected the reactive nature of Serb 
nationalism and the response (or, in most cases, nonresponse) of ordinary citizens23, 
but diverted all culpability to one actor – communist leader Slobodan Milosević, dubbed 
“the butcher of the Balkans” by the West. 
                                                        
23 Studies of Serbia and Croatia during the Yugoslav conflicts of 1991–5 found that most 
people were preoccupied with mundane bread-and-butter issues rather than with 
fratricidal hatred (Gordy 1999; Gagnon 2004). 
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The first hint of serious trouble in Kosovo came on March 1981 when Albanian 
university students in Kosovo revolted against the poor quality of food in their canteen.  
Though their grievance seemed benign, it was a catalyst for revolts across Kosovo that 
soon took on a political nature as a national revival for Kosovo’s status as its own 
republic.  Despite the fact that Kosovo had become overwhelmingly Albanian, Kosovo’s 
place in Serbian mythology maintained the region as the cradle of Serb history and 
nationalism.  Accordingly, revolts were repeatedly squashed by Serb led police and 
military.   It is at this point, not in ancient history, that nationalism in Kosovo entered 
Phase A, Conscious Nationalism, and the point at which the Roma, being neither Serb 
nor Albanian, became outsiders in the nationalist ideology.   
Phase A – Conscious Nationalism 
 A conscious development of shared memory and culture of a particular territory 
constitutes Phase A of nation-building according to the theory triangulation model.   
Phase A takes place in territory under direct rule with sufficient cultural homogeneity to 
foster territorial solidarity (Hechter 2000).   According to the 1981 census, Kosovo’s 
Albanians made up 77.42% of the population.  In 1991, the Albanians, Muslims and 
some Roma boycotted the census (a practice that continues today), under the claim 
made by Rugova that the census underestimated their true numbers.24  However, 
Yugoslav statistical projections set the Albanian population at 81.6%.   
                                                        
24 In an interesting replay of history, Albanians in Macedonia are boycotting the 2011 
census for the same reasons. 
Figure 
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4: Kosovo Demographics 1981 
 
Figure 
 
Census data show there was indeed “sufficient cultural homogeneity” of Albanians in 
Kosovo to render Kosovo an Albanian 
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5: Kosovo Demographics 1991 (est) 
majority.  For Albanians the claim to 
 
Kosovo was, 
and always has been, rooted in ethnicity.
subsequent formation of a national identity” 
Table 5: Population of Albanians and Serbs 1948
 
Since the end of World War II the Albanian population in Kosovo increased from 68% of 
the total population in 1948 to 77% in 1981.
Balkan analysis website Serbianna
statistical analysis of Kosovo’s growing Albanian population.  An economist, 
mathematician and political scientist, Boz
arguments put forth by the West and the Albanians for the population increase: 
voluntary Serb emigration and increasing Albanian birth rates.  Bozinovich found the 
following compelling evidence:
1. Kosovo’s Albanian homogenizati
between Albanian growth rate and the growth rate of the total population. In other 
words, the total population is missing 0.47% annually, which is precisely the rate 
at which Albanian population share has been
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  In a 2003 article for the online 
, M. Bozinovich (2003) provided an in-
inovich statistically challenged the popular 
 
on is .47% per year - precisely the difference 
 increasing. The implication is that 
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the homogenization may not be due to disproportionally larger birth rate of the 
Albanians against others but rather due to a declining population of non-
Albanians. 
2. Economic incentives as sole reasons for migration of Kosovo Serbs strikes as 
fundamentally unsound on two levels. First, while migratory economic incentives 
exert uniformly upon all populations, the Albanian majority, nevertheless, 
maintained its exponential growth rate while Serbs were forced into a parabolic 
decline. On the second level, there exists no population model where economic 
incentives are a sole cause for an overall population decline.  
Ironically, Bozinovich’s parabolic growth equation, shown below, suggested that Kosovo 
Serb population should have reached zero 58.96 years from 1948, positing that Serbs 
would be exterminated from Kosovo by November 16, 2006.   
 
Table 6: Kosovo Serb Parabolic Growth 
 
The Statistical Office of Kosovo reported Serb population at 5.3% in 2006, the majority 
of which had been pushed into ethnic enclaves in northern Kosovo, an area still rife with 
violence and political tension.    
 It was also during this period that the division of Roma into Serb speaking Roma 
and Albanian speaking Ashkali and Egyptians solidified (Marushiakova and Popov 
2001a).  Many Serb speaking Roma fled to northern Kosovo and into Serbia proper.  
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Most of the Ashkali continued to live alongside their Albanian neighbors and registered 
as Albanians.  Albanians in Kosovo have historically put pressure on the Roma to 
Albanize in order to increase their numbers.  Salja Bajrush*, a Rom born in Kosovo, 
explains that his name is Albanian, although he is Rom: “They even gave us their 
names and we were talking their language.  And we didn’t have the right to register 
ourselves as Roma; we had to register as Albanians.  We had to do that . . . But I am 
not Albanian.  I am Rom.”        
  In 1991, the Egyptian activists upset the process of Albanizing Roma by 
persuading Yugoslav authorities to include the Egyptian identity on the census.  3,307 
people, 0.2 % declared themselves as Egyptians in 1991 (Friedman 1993:197), an 
amount disputed by Egyptian activists, prompting petitions and media attention.  
Yugoslav headlines ranged from seriousness to satire, running captions such as: 
"Egyptians on the Territory of Yugoslavia", "The Egyuptsi are no Longer Roma", "The 
Egyptians are in the Census", "They are no Longer Albanians", "Egyuptsi - Egyptians 
from Ohrid and Struga", "Neither Albanians nor Roma", "Where are We, the Egyptians", 
"What is happening to the Egyuptsi", "Egyptians - a New Nationality", "Heirs of the Sun 
God", "Ohrid is Full of Pharaohs" (Marushiakova and Popov 2001b; Zemon 1996).  The 
German magazine Der Spiegel reported that Yugoslav President Milosevič decided to 
recognize Egyptians as a distinct population group in advance of the forthcoming 
elections: “The Serbian leader suddenly claims that the Albanian majority in Yugoslavia 
are in reality Egyptians . . . The chief of the federal commission for the next census, 
Hisein Ramadani, comes closer to the truth: The hundreds of Egyptians represent at 
best a handful of Gypsies who have been Albanianised for a long time but suddenly do 
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not want to be Albanians” (Der Spiegel 1990, as cited in Trubeta 2005:71).  Although 
Serbs were heading north, the Serbian government still strategically held Kosovo. It was 
beneficial for Roma to disassociate from the Albanians and side with the Serbs or 
create a new identity.  It is not difficult to imagine the push-pull factors that put the 
Roma in a precarious position that forced them to question, negotiate or hide their own 
ethnicity.  Nor is it difficult to understand the confusion Roma must have endured, as 
King and Mason (2006) explain, “Albanians controlled the private sector while Serbs 
controlled the public sector” (40). 
 While the Albanians’ nationalism was fostered through cultural homogeneity, the 
Serbs validated their hold on Kosovo and their rallying nationalism through history.  
Adhering well to Hobsbawm (1992) and Hroch’s (2000) theories of history and cultural 
destiny, the Serbs evoked memories of the Battle of Kosovo and cited its long history as 
the heart of Serbian culture and statehood.  The thousands of Orthodox churches and 
monuments dotting the Kosovar landscape were physical testaments to Serbian 
historicity.  Serbian history and culture is deeply embedded in the crumbling Orthodox 
foundations of Kosovo.  
 Kosovo in Serbian translates to the “field of the blackbirds.”  It was upon this field, 
near Priština, on June 28 1389 that the Serbian Prince Lazar met Ottomon Sultan 
Murad in battle after refusing to submit to Turkish rule.  Legend tells that God came to 
Lazar the night of the battle and offered the prince a choice: God could intercede on 
behalf of the Serbs to save the Serbian state – their earthly kingdom; or they could face 
the invaders alone, perish and ascend into God’s heavenly kingdom with the promise 
that the Serbian state would one day be resurrected.  Lazar must then choose between 
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his earthly kingdom, or a heavenly kingdom, the latter representative of sacrifice and 
martyrdom of the Serbian people.  Though historical facts of the battle are uncertain, 
both leaders and the majority of their men lost their lives in a battle that essentially 
ended in a tie.  Lazar’s remains lie perfectly preserved at Ravanica Monastery in Serbia, 
his coffin opened on Sundays for the devout to pay their respects.  It is said his remains 
cure diseases and make miracles.   
The Battle of Kosovo is deeply embedded in the Serbian national history through 
school history books, art, poetry, theater and movies.   Most prominent is the epic poem 
and song, “The Downfall of the Serbian Empire” (Vuk Karadžić 1815, English translation 
in Noyes and Bacon 1913): 
 
 
 
After the battle Archbishop Danilo recorded the following words allegedly spoken by 
Lazar: 
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It is better to die in battle than to live in shame.  Better it is for us to accept death 
from the sword than to offer our shoulders to the enemy.  We have lived a long 
time for the world; in the end we seek to accept the martyr’s struggle and to live 
forever in heaven.  We call ourselves Christian soldiers, martyrs for godliness 
(Bideleux and Jeffries 2007). 
 
This famous speech has been woven in the Serb narrative for centuries and was much 
quoted throughout the 1990’s.  “The martyr’s struggle” has, in a very strong sense, 
become the cultural destiny of the Serbian people.  It is, as Smith writes, “nationalism, 
as an ideological movement that . . .draws much of its passion, conviction and intensity 
from the belief in a national mission and destiny; and this belief in turn owes much to a 
powerful religious myth of ethnic election.  Modern nationalism can be seen in part as 
deriving from powerful, external and pre-modern traditions, symbols, and myths which 
are then taken up and recast in the nationalist ideologies of national mission and destiny 
as these emerge in the crucible of modernization” (Smith 1999:107). 
Lazar was sainted and the Serbs, emblematic of good Christians, called 
themselves God’s chosen people, the servants of God.25  The fervor with which the 
Serbs embraced not only their religiosity but their religious designation as servants of 
God, holders of Kosovo’s resurrection, gave the long quest to reclaim and “avenge” 
Kosovo the characteristics of a holy war.   The reclamation of their sacred land gave to 
the Serbs Hobsbawm’s third criteria: a proven capacity for conquest, because “there is 
nothing like being an imperial people to make a population conscious of its collective 
existence” (Hobsbawm 1992:38). 
                                                        
25 For a deeply religious and poetic view of Serbian history see Srpski Narod kao Teodul 
(The Serbian People as a Servant of God) by Bishop Nikolai Velimirović of Thrice-Blessed 
Memory and translated by Fr. Theodore Micka and Fr. Steven Scott.  All ninety-nine 
chapters are available online at http://www.sv-luka.org/library/ServantOfGod.html.  
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The Serbs mark Lazar’s martyred sainthood on St. Vitus Day, June 28, a day 
intentionally shared with other key historic events.   It is possible no other national 
history is so strongly connected with a single date (Bieber 2002:107).   More importantly, 
the celebrations of St. Vitus day began with the peasants, a bottom up movement, as 
opposed to a nationalist movement pushed down from political elite.  This ties in tightly 
with Hobsbawm’s caution that students of nationalism must understand nationalism 
from the lives of ordinary people, that is, to take the view from below “in terms of the 
assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people” (Hobsbawm 
1992:10). 
St. Vitus Day was officially recognized in 1889 at the commemoration of the 500th 
anniversary of the battle.  The opening speech during this period of celebration, given 
by Serbia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Čedomilj Mijatović, was patriotic and emotional 
and serves as a symbol of Kosovo’s link to Serbian history: 
An inexhaustible source of national pride was discovered on Kosovo. More 
important than language and stronger than the Church, this pride unites all Serbs 
in a single nation ... The glory of the Kosovo heroes shone like a radiant star in 
that dark night of almost 500 years ... Our people continued the battle in the 16th, 
17th, and 18th centuries when they tried to recover their freedom through 
countless uprisings. There was never a war for freedom (and when was there no 
war) in which the spirit of the Kosovo heroes did not participate! The new history 
of Serbia begins with Kosovo - a history of valiant efforts, long suffering, endless 
wars and unquenchable glory ... Karadjordje breathed with the breath of Kosovo, 
and the Obrenovici placed Kosovo in the coat of arms of their dynasty. We bless 
Kosovo because the memory of the Kosovo heroes upheld us, encouraged us, 
taught us and guided us. (Mijatović 1889) 
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The Roma too hold a history that is entwined with the epic of Lazar.  In 1915, 
John Reed (1916) wrote his accounts of wartime travel through the Balkans: 
Every regiment has two or three gypsies, who march with the troops, playing the 
Serbian fiddle or the bagpipes, and accompany the songs that are composed 
incessantly by the soldiers – love songs, celebrations of victory, epic chants.  
And all through Serbia they are the musicians of the people, travelling from one 
country festa to another, playing for dancing and singing. (41) 
 
 As stated earlier, it is difficult to find data on Roma in Kosovo, both historically 
and statistically.  Their history is often a postscript in other histories of the region as in 
the single paragraph above found in Reed’s book.   Although they did not identify with a 
nation-state or rest their existence on myth and legend, their history in the region helps 
to explain where they fell between Serbian and Albanian nationalism.  Stigmatized, 
punished and marginalized by Ottoman society, an examination of Roma in the region 
also offers insight into why many of them sided with the Serbs.  With the domination of 
the Ottomans over Balkan lands, a distinct divisional line was drawn between Muslims 
and non-Muslims (zimmis), creating a sort of “moral community” (Durkheim 2006) in 
which non-Muslims were excluded.  It was a deeply entrenched Muslim society wherein 
“Islam is a precondition of active political participation” (Gellner 1981:44).  Most Roma 
and the Serbs collectively fell into the non-Muslim division.  Rather than expel non-
Muslim, the Ottoman Empire used them to their advantage.  As Gellner (1981) explains, 
“Non-Islamic status can of course be a positive advantage and enhance the usefulness 
of a group . . . quite apart from the feature of making it liable to special taxation, the 
political disfranchisement of a group makes it a more attractive partner for special 
purposes” (44-45).   
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Muslim Roma, or those who had converted (and the majority did convert), were 
never fully trusted as such; they were seen as “part of the Empire’s establishment” 
(Crowe 2007).  They were taxed higher than non-Roma Muslims because converted 
Roma, in the eyes of the Serbs, were betrayers who had essentially become Turks.  
From their early history in the Balkans, Roma were forced to choose a side, neither of 
which pulled them from the margins of society.  Indeed, aside from Muslim and non-
Muslim, the Turks instituted another social category reserved for Gypsies.  All Gypsies 
paid taxes; the tax for non-Muslim Gypsies was higher than that of their Muslim 
counterparts.  Obviously Roma who converted to Islam fared better under Turkish rule 
and, for a while, Roma under the Ottoman Empire fared better than their European 
counterparts. 
During the early eighteenth century, many Roma found safe haven in Serbia as 
they escaped slavery and political instability in Wallachia and Moldavia.  To avoid 
mistreatment as Turks, they began to identify themselves as Roma, more so after the 
Serbian insurrection of 1804-1806 (Petrović 1935).   Many returned to Christianity and 
settled well with the Serbs, a situation that theologian Edson L. Clark (1878) found 
“peculiar and very different:”   
In Servia, the leveling power of Turkish rule, exerted for successive ages, had 
the effect of elevating the Gypsies somewhat toward the social status of the other 
rayahs. Here, therefore, although they are still an inferior caste, and not allowed 
to exercise the rights and powers of citizenship, the Gypsies are perhaps less 
widely separated from the peasantry around them than anywhere else in Europe. 
They fought bravely with their Servian neighbors against the Turks, and as 
smiths, farriers, and dealers in live stock, have many of them earned a 
comfortable livelihood, and proved themselves respectable members of society. 
(504) 
 89 
“Respectable members of society,” however came with a price that Clark fails to 
mention.  In his 1903 dissertation, ethnologist Tihomir Gjorgjevic compiled a list of what 
had been done for and against the Roma in Serbia to put them “nominally on an equal 
footing with the rest of the inhabitants of Servia” (43).  Those caught wandering were to 
be arrested and imprisoned.  “Equal footing” of course included equal religion, thus 
Bishop Melentije “issued a confidential mandate ordering the Serbs to make Orthodox 
converts of ‘irreligious” Gypsies.  The Bishop “bestirred himself and had no less than 
2222 Gypsies baptized in his diocese in 1892-95” (24).   
David Crowe (2007) turns to the census data to demonstrate why the Serbian 
government enforced a sedentary lifestyle for the Roma.  Settled Roma were more 
likely to move into urban areas than roam the countryside where resources were more 
readily available and they could ply their trades.  Census data show an increase of 
Romani population in urban areas.  Crowe (2007) points out that Roma in urban areas 
were more likely to speak Serbian than their native Romani or Romanian, thus strict 
mandates against wandering served to Serbianize the Roma.  The process worked, 
making the Roma “loyal Serbian citizens” (211) who fought and died alongside their 
Serbian neighbors throughout the wars of the twentieth century.   
Another sector of nationalism that often goes unrecorded in Yugoslavia is the 
deflection of Western nationalism upon the Balkan region.  To the West, Milosević 
represented the last stronghold of communism in Europe; to unseat him would give the 
West economic influence over Yugoslavia.   An example of this came in 1992 when the 
US State Department allowed a naturalized citizen, Milan Panić, to return to Belgrade 
as Prime Minister of Serbia.  Milosević invited Panić hoping he would have a positive 
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influence on the international isolation of Yugoslavia.  Though it is a violation of US law 
for any citizen to vote in or run for political office abroad, the US believed Panić would 
have a positive influence on democratic ideology.  Panić was the ideal American rags-
to-riches image.  Born to poor parents in Belgrade, Panić defected to the West in 1956 
and went on to become a pharmaceutical multimillionaire. The State Department 
provided Panić an ambiguous waiver allowing him not only to serve as Prime Minister 
but also to run against Milosevič for the presidency.  The plan backfired when state 
controlled Serb media attacked Panić as a traitor, calling him Bush’s secret agent who 
negotiated with “Albanian separatists” in Kosovo and whose true purpose was to keep 
the new Yugoslavia under sanctions indefinitely (Udovički and Ridgeway 2000:117).  
Panić had indeed gone rogue; it cost him the election and colored him a “bad Serb.”  It 
also loosened restraints on Milosevič’s designs for Kosovo. 
Phase B – Quiet Nationalism (1986-1996) 
The transition from a conscious nationalism to mass movements of nationalism is 
not instantaneous.  The ideologies of the elite, those propagating the myths of history in 
the case of the Serbs or those manipulating census data in the case of the Albanians, 
must take hold within the larger population.  One of the ways in which the common 
people become members of an historic state is through the production of proto-
nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992), a sentiment akin to modern patriotism, but one that 
must be planted into the minds of the less literate and is often based on old religious 
foundations (67), ethnicity (64), language (52), cultural icons (72), and/or the 
consciousness of belonging to a lasting political entity (74).   Hechter (2000) adds that 
an amount of time must pass to persuade recruits that the new regime will last.  It is in 
Phase B that the time and resources needed to build up political organizations are 
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acquired.  Recruits must be secretly trained and provisioned. Temporal lag is due to the 
“time intensity that is inherent in organizing militant collective action” (l897).  During this 
lag Hroch’s (2000) phase manifested itself through the development of various Albanian 
organizations and the leadership of Milosevič, both seeking “to win over as many of 
their ethnic group as possible to the project of creating a future nation, by patriotic 
agitation to ‘awaken’ national consciousness among them” (81).  The following section 
seeks to detail the events between 1986 and 1996 that are parallel to Phase B of the 
triangulation table.  Additionally this phase demonstrates how Hechter’s (2000) 
peripheral nationalism rose in Kosovo after Serbia abrogated Kosovo’s autonomy. 
Though nationalism in Kosovo, indeed in the whole of Yugoslavia, has been 
portrayed as rooted in ethnicity, irredentism, and age-old hatreds, the very foundation of 
national movements is solidly situated on power and the means to maintain that power.  
After the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, Western ideology posed a 
direct threat to the Serbian Communist Party, led by Milosevič. Other republican leaders, 
first in in Slovenia and Croatia, viewed the break from communism as their path to 
independence.  Kosovo followed suit, first staging mass demonstrations for a Kosovo 
Republic, improved conditions for workers and students, freedom for political prisoners 
(60% of Yugoslavia’s political prisoners were Kosovo Albanians), and unification with 
Albania (King and Mason 2006).  Conservatives in Serbia responded by shifting 
attention toward ethnic questions, in particular the alleged "ethnic cleansing" of Serbs in 
Kosovo.  According to Van Evera (2001) the twentieth-century Serbian national identity 
relies on a recent binary opposition, in which the enemy is seen as “fascist” or almost 
“genetically programmed for genocide.”  If this is indeed the case, Milosevič used it to 
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his advantage in manipulating Serbs into divisional lines of ethnic hate.  The 
government-controlled media reported violence against Kosovo Serbs on a daily basis.  
Reports claimed the Serbs were leaving Kosovo under pressure from the Albanians, 
Serbian women were raped, their houses plundered and burned.  The news from 
Kosovo of the alleged atrocities – the ethnic cleansing – of fellow Serbs enraged the 
public.   
On April 24, 1987 Milosevič went to Kosovo Polje to meet with angered Kosovo 
Serbs.  Milosevič tapped into the discontent of his fellow Serbs in a speech greatly 
reminiscent of Lazar’s battle speech:   
First I want to tell you, comrades, that you should stay here. This is your country, 
these are your houses, your fields and gardens, your memories. You are not 
going to abandon your lands because life is hard, because you are oppressed by 
injustice and humiliation. It has never been a characteristic of the Serbian and 
Montenegrin people to retreat in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when they 
should fight, to become demoralized when things are difficult. You should stay 
here, both for your ancestors and your descendants. Otherwise you would 
shame your ancestors and disappoint your descendants. But I do not suggest 
you stay here suffering and enduring a situation with which you are not sat-isfied. 
On the contrary! It should be changed, together with all progressive people here, 
in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia 
would disintegrate without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give 
up Kosovo! 
 
The echoing cries of history, however, would not be enough to hold on to Kosovo.   
In March 1989, the Serbian Parliament adopted constitutional measures that revoked 
Kosovo’s legislative, executive and judicial powers and passed direct control of Kosovo 
to Belgrade.  It is difficult to imagine the timing, coinciding with the collapse of the 
socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, as a coincidental event.  It was a move that 
resulted in political chaos and sent Yugoslavia into political turmoil. 
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By the beginning of 1990, Kosovo declared itself a republic, set up a shadow 
government, and instituted parallel Kosovo Albanian-run institutions.  The Kosovo 
Albanian strategy, influenced by the situation in Croatia, was to attract the attention of 
the West in order to garner its support and emphasize Kosovo’s intent to Europeanize.   
Five of the most significantly active opposition groups, the "National Liberation 
Movement of Kosovo and Other Parts of Yugoslavia", "Kosovo Marxist-Leninist 
Organization", "Communist Marxist-Leninist party of Albanians in Yugoslavia", "Red 
National Front", and the "Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo", merged into 
one organization, the "Popular Movement for Kosovo" (Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e 
Kosoves or LPK).  Because of their positions as political activists in a climate wrought 
with tension, many members of the group were composed of Kosovo Albanian diaspora, 
operating from Germany and Switzerland.26  The mission of the LPK follows: 
To achieve the national objectives, the liberation of the country, LP will employ 
every form of liberation wars: democratic, peaceful, as well as those of armed 
uprisings. (Kelmendi 1999) 
 
 
For many years the Albanian resistance movement in Kosovo operated under these 
national objectives with varying strands of non-violent and armed groups.  As members 
became disillusioned and frustrated with the non-violent approach, offshoots of the 
“armed uprising” objectives sprung from the LPK, but were not organized enough to fully 
develop.  Members of the LPK did provide political and financial support for the growing 
armed resistance, assistance that created the “right conditions for the establishment of 
                                                        
26 Operating at a distance did not ensure their safety.  At a meeting near Stuttgart on 
January 17, 1982,  Jusuf Gervalla, founder of the Movement for the National Liberation of 
Kosova, his brother Bardhosh Gervalla, and Kadri Zeka, leader of the Group of Marxist-
Leninists of Kosova (GMLK), were gunned down by unknown assassins.  
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the KLA” (Berghof Conflict Research 2010).  Little is known about the establishment of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, in Albanian Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or UÇK), 
but the first record of its existance is found in a letter dated November 19, 1994 in which 
the organization took responisibility for insurgent attacks against Yugoslav police 
(Elshani 1998).   The KLA was also financed by the Albanian diaspora in the west.  The 
“Homeland Calling” fund was based in Switzerland as a depository for Albanians abroad 
to support the war for liberation.  The Albanian diaspora in the West were asked to pay 
3% of their salary or 10% of business profits (Judah 2000:70-71).  Members were sent 
to Albania where retired Albanian military officers volunteered to train KLA members in 
guerilla war tactics.  The group carried out random attacks through 1996, but wouldn’t 
gain major momentum until the collapse of Albania in 1997. 
Although the period between 1986 and 1996 was not without sporadic violence, it 
was in a space of “temporal lag” during which the Milosevič regime and the KLA 
recruited, manipulated and indoctrinated the “national idea.”  Much of the resistance in 
Kosovo remained underground for fear of assassination or imprisonment.  Milosevič, 
meanwhile, campaigned for communism and the idea of a “Greater Serbia,” not unlike 
the one for which Lazar died.  He also appealed to the Roma of Kosovo, a population 
the Kosovo Albanians currently neglected.  For their support, Milosevič offered them the 
shallow promise of political representation.  Some were persuaded, others stayed out of 
politics because they felt trapped between the “exacting standards of loyalty among the 
Albanian community” and the “omnipresent Serbian police” (Cahn and Peric 1999:22).   
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Phase C – Mass Nationalism (1996-Present) 
Hroch, Hechter, and Hobsbawm’s third stage of nation-building and nationalism 
all point to a gain in mass support.  The mass support of the nationalist movements in 
Kosovo and Serbia proper against Kosovo is much more complicated than it would 
appear.  One must question the general support of the Serb people when conscription 
was implemented and little more than 50% of soldiers actually showed up for duty.  In 
Kosovo, the average civilian was too burdened with fear to act against his or her own 
neighbor.  The KLA wasn’t just targeting non-Kosovo Albanians, but its attention also 
turned inward, extending to anyone, Kosovo Albanians included, who did not support 
independence or their means for achieving it.  In this regard, “mass support” takes on a 
bit of flexibility to encompass the support of the dominant population.  Coercion, threats, 
and violence have an uncanny way of garnering support.  The exchange of populations 
across borders, non-Kosovo Albanians (and some Kosovo Albanians) fled to Serbia and 
Albanians trickled into Kosovo, also helps to increase support in the host country.  
Essentially when people are afraid to speak out, their silence can be mistaken for 
passive support.   
The Yugoslavian police, still under Serb control, and the now dominant KLA had 
one primary means of silencing the opposition and reaching their goals: violence.  The 
KLA, which had begun with a small group of armed resisters, received a major gain to 
its membership and arsenal in 1997 when anarchy broke out in Albania following a 
series of collapsed financial schemes.  Weapons flowed across the border, some in 
crates for about $10 a piece and others in the arms of thugs.  A UN study found that at 
least 200,000 Kalashnikov automatic assault weapons stolen from Albanian military 
armories wound up in the KLA arsenal (Khakee and Florqui June 2003).  This did much 
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more than simply level the bloody playing field; it gave the KLA more than three times 
the amount of militia held by the Serbs.   
It is difficult to place the KLA within the realms of a nationalist group.  For one, its 
political ideology tended to shift from communism to anti-communism to neutrality 
depending upon whose help it sought.  As war correspondent Chris Hedges reported to 
Foreign Affairs in June of 1999, "the KLA splits down a bizarre ideological divide, with 
hints of fascism on one side and whiffs of communism on the other. . . [it] is led by the 
sons and grandsons of rightist Albanian fighters -- either the heirs of those who fought in 
the World War II fascist militias and the Skanderbeg volunteer SS division raised by the 
Nazis, or the descendants of the rightist Albanian rebels who rose up against the Serbs 
80 years ago.”  There is also extensive evidence that the KLA’s largest funding 
mechanism came through the Albanian mafia’s drug smuggling cartel based in 
Priština.27  Secondly, many members of the KLA were motivated by opportunism rather 
than ideology.  “Nationalism is a refuge from uncertainty,” wrote Sam Vaknin (Viviano 
May 5, 1999) in his essay on the KLA.  The uncertainty of Kosovo’s future coupled with 
the growing fire power of the KLA (and no doubt the spoils of war) served as a 
successful recruiting tool for the KLA.  “All the people of Kosova will join us when they 
realize there is no peace to be made with the Serbs,” the commander of the KLA is 
reported to have touted, “All these Serbian police you see on the roads—prepare next 
week to see their bodies. My mother brought me into this world to die for Kosova and I 
am ready to do this” (Pascal 1999:55).  
                                                        
27 The KLA’s association with drug money is well documented.  See Michel 
Chossudovsky, Kosovo Freedom Fighters Financed by Organized Crime, Covert Action 
Quarterly, 1999.  As a result of this, the Balkans today accounts for 90% of the heroin 
exports into Europe (Viviano May 5, 1999). 
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The KLA carried out various hit and run attacks against Yugoslavia police (again, 
mostly Serb) and military posts.  At times, in order to gain support, they blamed the 
attacks on the Serbs, arguing that it was a setup to provoke Kosovo Albanians.  
Eventually they took all the credit, in turn provoking the Serbs into more direct action.  
The Serb forces responded by burning KLA held villages displacing some 200,000 
people while the KLA retreated.  Because the Serbian government considered the KLA 
a criminal organization and despite the mass displacement and fear of thousands of 
civilians, the Serbs believed their actions were justified.  For a brief time, this sentiment 
was echoed by the United States, as Agence France Presse reported on the words of 
Kosovo special envoy Robert Gelbard on February 23, 1998: 
“The violence we have seen growing is incredibly dangerous,'”Gelbard said. He 
criticized violence “promulgated by the (Serb) police” and condemned the actions 
of an ethnic Albanian underground group Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) which 
has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Serb targets. 'We condemn 
very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The UCK is, without any questions, a 
terrorist group.”. 
 
If the KLA was a terrorist organization, didn’t that give Serbs the go-ahead to eliminate 
them?   
On March 5 1998, Serb forces launched a vast operation to decapitate the KLA 
by eliminating Adem Jashari and his comrades, considered to be the core of the KLA.  
The stand off in the village of Drenica lasted for two days, finally ending with the 
execution of the entire family and several villagers, including women and children 
(eighty-five deaths total).  This event changed the climate in Kosovo from civil unrest to 
full blown war.  More importantly, it caught the attention of the West. Robert Gelbard 
modified his statement to the New York Times on March 13, noting that “while it has 
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‘committed terrorist acts,' it has 'not been classified legally by the U.S. Government as a 
terrorist organization.’''  When asked if the US may consider military strikes against 
Serbia, Gelbard said the US would first try to end human rights abuses against the 
ethnic Albanian majority through ''every possible economic sanction or other kind of tool 
we have diplomatically, but we're not ruling anything out'' (Shenon March 13, 1998).  
The KLA was no longer a terrorist organization and had achieved its goal of Western 
support.  The UN stepped in issuing a resolution that condemned Serb attacks and 
instituted an arms embargo in Yugoslavia (Resolution 1160). 
 Any work on recent Balkan history details the failure of the Rambouillet 
 Agreement and the intense fighting that continued through March of 1999.  By then the 
credibility of the West’s ability to stop the war in Kosovo was in question.  As Gearóid Ó 
Tuathail (1998) argues, “Failure by the European Union would not only reflect badly on 
the ability of that institution to develop its own independent security identity separate 
from the Americans but also tarnish the continental myths -- peace, progress and 
prosperity through integration and unity -- that underpinned the European Union. The 
EU's failure would ultimately involve the United States for it served as the ultimate 
guarantor of the European security order” (176).  The guarantor would be NATO, an 
organization with questionable value since the end of the Cold War and one in 
desperate need of establishing its “credibility.”   
In the summer of 1999, NATO asserted that its new role would be to perform 
European crisis management and peacekeeping in co-ordination with the CSCE/OSCE, 
the European Union, the West European Union, and the United Nations (Ullman 
1996:25).  Tony Blair asserted that NATO’s commitment to “spread[ing] the values of 
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liberty, human rights, the rule of law and an open society” would make Europe a “safer” 
place ("A New Moral Crusade"  June 14, 1999).  Thus, the nationalistic ideologies of the 
European Order would be dropped upon Serbia in the form of “peace bombs.”    From 
March 24 to June 10, 1999, NATO dropped bombs on strategic targets in Serbia.  Some 
were indeed strategic – military installations, government run (but civilian employed) 
media stations, but others, according to NATO Air Commodore David Wilby “fell short of 
the target” (BBC 1999).  Those that “fell short” included convoys of refugees fleeing 
Kosovo, an elementary school, a national forest, an oil refinery that sent carcinogens 
into the air and water, and bridges that carried people to the hospital.   The US 
dominated NATO forced Milosevič to capitulate and withdraw forces from Kosovo.  The 
US took on responsibility for securing the borders, spearheading the imposition of 
NATO “peacekeepers” throughout the region.  In the words of one commentator, the 
strong sense of the necessity of “humanitarian interventions” evoked a kind of 
“reworking of the white man’s burden discourse” (Stråth 2000:419).  The Western 
intervention resulted in Resolution 1244 and created a complex and ambiguous political 
situation for Kosovo after the NATO bombing. It established a formal declaration of the 
right to independence, instituted an international civilian administration, known as the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), approved the 
deployment of the NATO-led multi-national Kosovo Force (KFOR), and promised a 
secure and safe environment for all the inhabitants of Kosovo.28  All, of course, under 
the guiding hand of the West and according to their stipulations. 
                                                        
28 1244 opened a Pandora’s Box in the international community by creating a potentially 
dangerous precedent for other groups that seek independence based on ethnic divisions. 
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The NATO bombing, intended to end the war, did little to end the violence. 
Between June and December 1999, 454 murders, 190 kidnappings, and 1,327 incidents 
of arson took place in Kosovo (UNMIK, August 2000).  The ongoing violence after 
Resolution 1244 demonstrates that the Kosovo Albanian national movement was built 
purely upon the basis of ethnicity.  Even while travelling the road to full-fledged 
independence, the priority was to ethnically cleanse the new Kosovo of all non-
Albanians.   The vision, therefore, of a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo in the post-NATO 
period was “doomed to be a desirable but unrealistic vision confined in the speeches of 
members of the international community” (Sahin 2009:247).   
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The Unmaking of Kosovar Roma 
It was clear there would be no place for non-Kosovo Albanians in the landscape 
of a Kosovo fighting for independence based on ethnic purity.  This not only meant the 
elimination of Serbs from its internal structures, but also put Kosovo’s Roma in a 
precarious position.  In Kosovo, Serbs and Albanians have “denied, hidden, forcedly 
removed and then recalled the Roma whenever required by their political needs’’ 
(Sigona 2003:72).  Throughout the violence in Kosovo, Roma reacted in different ways 
– some fled the region by force or choice, some sided with the Serbs, some with the 
Albanians, others did nothing.  Many of those who did take up sides did so under threat, 
promises of a better future, or simply for essential supplies like food or the spoils of 
looting.  Investigators for The Humanitarian Law Center (1999) found that both sides 
coerced the Roma to take part in the war by looting and burning homes, manning 
checkpoints, and burying (hiding) the bodies of the opposition. 
Roma working for Serb public companies were ordered to steal by their superiors 
or lose their positions. R.R., a former employee of the Klanica enterprise in Kosovo 
Polje, reported that Roma employees were forced to loot warehouses owned by ethnic 
Albanians: 
They made us go into Albanian warehouses. We didn’t want to because we were 
afraid of what would happen to us afterwards. We carried out home appliances, 
furniture, doors, windows, building materials, paint, bathtubs and sinks. We even 
loaded one truck with medicines from an Albanian warehouse in the Velanija 
neighborhood. Everything was taken to the Gornje Dobrevo pig farm in Kosovo 
Polje. The boss, Gemaljević, and the chief stock keeper, Doberović, took pictures 
of us as we were taking stuff from Shiptar warehouses.  
 
Despite the Albanian claim that all Roma sided with the Serbs, the Humanitarian 
Law Center (1999) reported on cases where Roma were forced to perform war tasks for 
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the Albanians in equal number to those performed for the Serbs.  Albanians gave no 
recompense for the work performed, only the incentive of living through the day. A 
Romani man from Peć told investigators that he and his brother were made to loot Serb 
houses: 
A KLA man came to our house at the end of June and ordered me and my older 
brother to go with him to load and unload goods the Albanians were stealing in 
houses from which Serbs had moved out. We didn’t want to, but went when he 
threatened to bring his men and put us and our families down like dogs. We had 
to go to save the lives of our families and our own lives. 
 
F.T. of Obilić recounts how Roma were forced to bury bodies of Serbs. Albanian 
neighbors stormed into his house and ordered him to do “sanitation work” for them. 
“That meant that I had to go clean up and bury dead bodies. Otherwise they would have 
killed us all.”  
M.L., a twenty-three-old employee of the Priština Sanitation Department, 
describes how he and nine co-workers were ordered by their manager and Serbian 
police officers to bury bodies of Kosovo Albanians: 
They told us to collect and bury the bodies, which were lying by a river. To reach 
the place, we had to go down a steep slope for about 50 or 60 meters. We 
carried the bodies one by one in blankets up the slope and put them in a trailer 
attached to a tractor. There were about 40 altogether. All were men in civies, 
from 25 to 50 years old. They were wearing pants or jeans, leather and ordinary 
jackets, sweat suits, sneakers or shoes. They had two, three or more gunshot 
wounds in the head, chest or belly. The bodies were still warm. Some had 
stiffened, others hadn’t. We buried them in the village’s Muslim graveyard, one 
by one. 
 
In a telling but tragic statement, Nijaz Saiti*, told interviewers that "Roma have always 
been damned and killed in every war."  Nijaz is from Priština and grew up with Serbs.  
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Recalling how Serbs looked only after themselves and made Roma break into stores, 
he believes the war "wasn't a real war; it was robbery." 
Many Roma also told investigators they were eyewitnesses of murders by KLA 
members. N.T. of Brestvenik village near Peć recounts how his relative Halil Muzija was 
killed on 16 June. Several KLA members came to the victim’s home and demanded that 
he turn over his rifle on pain of death. Though Halil did not own a firearm, the KLA men 
took him away. “The next day, at sunrise, about 5 a.m., Halil’s wife went to look for him. 
She found his body some 300 meters from the house. There were chains around his 
neck and it looked to her that he had been tied to a car and dragged behind it. There 
were bloodstains on the road. He also had three stab wounds” (HLC 1999). 
It is said that the victor writes history.  This is so in Kosovo where the Kosovo 
Albanians have erased not only the memories of their previously peaceful Roma 
neighbors, but they systematically deny enlisting, by force or any other method, the 
assistance of Roma in their brutalities.  Instead, they vehemently argue that all Roma 
took up arms with the Serbs.   "The Gypsies always came here and shouted insults at 
us," relayed Behar Hoti, an Albanian who stayed with his family in Vranjevac during the 
worst of the Serbian reprisals. "The Gypsies were together with the Serbs. They told 
them exactly who had money and where to go" Mr. Gashi, a former coal miner, added 
that the Serbs despise the Roma almost just as much. "They always go with those who 
are in power" (Lucian Kim 1999).   
Once NATO intervened and independence was on the horizon, the Kosovo 
Albanian nationalist movement had no tolerance for Roma in the new Kosova.  In June 
1999, a single month, 4,000 Roma from Priština were displaced.  By July, of 1,700 
Roma in Vucitern, only 70 remained.  Meanwhile the whole of the Romani distri
Mitrovicë, the largest Romani community in Yugoslavia, had been burned to the ground. 
(Mattern 2011:43).   
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international community, via UNMIK established itself there, while declaring Serb 
populated areas “no-go” for “security reasons” (United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo 3 March 2000).  The lack of international security in these areas left 
remaining Roma more vulnerable to violence. Further, at the lower level, aid 
organizations were primarily staffed by Albanians who not only influenced the 
organizational agenda but also had a tendency to turn the other way.  This meant that 
Roma in IDP camps were not exactly in safe shelter. 
Human Rights Watch reports during the NATO “peacekeeping” years 
consistently contain reports of attacks on Romani inhabited shelters and homes.  Roma 
in the Djakovica camp told Human Rights Watch that eight Roma men had been 
abducted by men in KLA uniforms in the end of June and July.  Bekim Mazdreku and 
Syl Golluba were taken on July 20 from the bridge just outside the Roma camp. Four 
males from the Rexha family, aged seven to fifty-five, were reportedly abducted on 
approximately July 7, and the Roma in the camp have no information about their 
whereabouts. Another Roma man, Bashkim Imeraj, was reportedly abducted in the end 
of June from his Djakovica home by three men in KLA uniforms, according to a family 
member who was present. His whereabouts are currently unknown (Human Rights 
Watch 1 August 1999).   
In the Cesmin Lug Temporary Community Shelter (TCS), an unknown person, 
allegedly armed with a machine gun and hand grenades, poured gasoline on the face of 
a Roma boy, set him ablaze on January 26, 2003; the perpetrator fled the scene and 
the victim was hospitalized for burn injuries.  Roma remaining in their homes were 
likewise terrorized, generally with persistent threats to vacate their homes.  An 
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Ashkaelia family in Hallaq, Lipjan municipality, was attacked for the ninth time on July 
21, 2003, with a grenade allegedly thrown into their garden.  In 2001, three family 
members of this same family were killed when stepping on a booby trap placed at their 
doorstep.  Lirak Celaj, a spokesman for the KLA in Priština, denied that the group was 
involved in attacks against Roma. ”We have sent many of our people to appeal (to 
Albanians),'' he said. “Stop doing this to these people.'' But he acknowledged that 
resentment of Gypsies is high. Asked how many of the refugees he believes may have 
collaborated with Serbs, he said, “Most of them'' (Heintz 1999).   
In Kosovo there are different conceptions of ethnic violence: direct physical and 
psychological violence, indirect psychological violence, and ethnic violence designed to 
prevent or punish inter-ethnic contact and cooperation. Many consider this last factor as 
the most important one sustaining hostility between groups (Chigas 2006).  It is a factor 
that is particularly poignant to the Roma who are collectively punished for any 
association with the Serbs.  Djemalj Kajtazi* claimed he had a good relationship with 
Albanians before the war. His children went to a Serbian school and because of that he 
says the Albanians burned down his house.  "Everything was gone in one night," he 
lamented.  We had to escape or the Albanians would have killed us.  My son escaped 
because he was afraid.  I have very beautiful daughters-in-law so the Albanians either 
would have raped them or killed them. That is why we escaped.  The pressure was too 
great.” 
Miljaim Ramadani*, an Ashkali with Albanian papers, suffered conflicting 
punishments from the Serbs and the Albanians.  One evening, his son Ramadan was 
beat by Serbs because they overheard him speaking Albanian with his brother.  Miljaim 
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reported that his son was beaten so badly that he was unable to walk home.  However, 
Miljaim had problems with the Albanians too, despite having spent his entire life living 
with them, as one of them.  He told interviewers the Albanians were convinced he was 
collaborating with the Serbian police.  They searched his house and then gave him 
twenty-four hours to leave.  Miljaim swore to the Albanians he was not collaborating and 
that Ramadan had given the KLA 500 euro.  They would not listen; instead they beat 
him, his son, and his wife.  Miljaim finally flagged down NATO troops, who would only 
stop after he shouted “Albanians! Albanians!”  NATO guarded them for three hours until 
an Albanian woman told the troops to stop guarding them because they had done “bad 
things to Albanians.”  NATO left.  Ramadan died soon after due to the injuries.   
Bajram Jashari* lived through World War II and remembers well his family’s fear 
of the Germans and Albanians.  He is again afraid of the Albanians, reporting that when 
the NATO bombs fell, there was more fear than when the Germans were in his town.  
The bombs shook his house and windows.  Bajram believes NATO “didn’t hit the 
military targets, only the civilians.”  He spent the weeks of NATO bombing sitting under 
the eaves of his home.  He was afraid if he went inside a bomb would fall on his house.  
Bajram Demiri* is a Muslim Rom with an Albanian surname.  In 1999, his 
Albanian neighbors beat him and looted his house.  He recalls that five KLA soldiers 
with machine guns entered his house around four in the afternoon.  After they beat him 
they asked for his identification.  When Bajram gave the soldiers his identification card, 
they told him he was not the Bjaram they were seeking.  They took everything from his 
house anyway.  Bajram’s teeth were all broken and he subsequently spent thirty-one 
days in the hospital recovering from the beating. 
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In March of 2004, a drive-by shooting of a nineteen year old Kosovo Serb in the 
principality of Priština kicked off a new round of ethnic violence throughout Kosovo.  
Serbs blocked the road from Priština to Macedonia and threw stones at KFOR and UN 
troops.  The next day, the Kosovo media reported on three Albanian youth who had 
drowned in the river running through Mitrovicë after being chased by Serbs with dogs.  
The outlash against non-Albanian Serbs in Kosovo was devastating and widespread.  
Over the next three days 4,100 minority community members were displaced – which is 
quantitatively more than the total number of minorities who had returned to Kosovo 
throughout 2003 (3,664 persons) (United Nations High Commission for Refugees June 
2004).  Serb churches were made into bonfires and their cemeteries desecrated.  These 
days served as a litmus test for the international community’s promise of protection, 
peace and multi-ethnicity.  It failed miserably, especially for remaining and returning 
Roma.  Several international aid organizations reported KFOR and UN troops left their 
posts as mobs approached, while some members of the newly formed Kosovo Police 
Service (KPS) actually joined the mob and participated in the violence (Human Rights 
Watch March 2004; International Crisis Group July 2004). 
ERRC research established that approximately 70 houses belonging to Ashkali 
were set on fire by Albanian attackers (referred to locally as "protesters") on March 18, 
2004, in the town of Vushtri, about 10 kilometers south of Mitrovicë where the pogroms 
on Kosovo Serbs had begun the day before. The houses were completely destroyed. 
According to Hamit Zymeri, an Ashkali, the total number of people burned out of Vushtri 
in the attack was 257; there were 87 children, 85 women, two of whom were pregnant, 
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13 children under three years of age, and 18 babies under six months of age (Petrova 
2004). 
Though some Roma did side with the Serbs, under duress or not, Albanians 
scapegoated all Roma in order to eliminate non-Albanians.  When a nation is built on 
ethnicity it must remove polluting factors.  The basic nationalist ideology seemed to be 
that Kosovo could not become Kosova unless it was ethnically pure.  The forced exile of 
Serbs alleviated much of the frustration.  However, as previously mentioned, lessened 
frustration can actually increase violent ideologies toward the victim (Billig 1976; 
Newman and Erber 2002).  Scapegoating and ideology strengthen identity and connect 
people to others who join them in working for a shared cause against a targeted group.   
The cyclic process results in a “continuum of destruction” (Staub 1989:17).  The idea 
that “most” Roma engaged in “bad things” against the Albanians allows the perpetrators 
to legitimize acts of retaliation.  On the other hand, the idea that many Roma registered 
as Albanians and sided with the Albanians legitimizes Serbia’s stance on returning them 
to Kosovo.  Ultimately, all Roma regardless of where they stood during the war years, 
have become scapegoats for both sides. 
Because Roma, not unlike Europe’s Jew s, have long been scapegoats in all 
parts of the world, the international community not only ignores their status as such, but 
also becomes an accomplice in their condemnation.  Just world thinking (Lerner, 1980), 
the tendency to believe that the world is a just place, makes perpetrators and 
bystanders see the suffering of victims as deserved, either because of their actions, or 
their character, or both.  One commentator stated that the hatred of the Albanians 
toward the Roma is “understandable” (UNHRC 2010:22) 
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The intervention of international forces in Kosovo put them in an unequivocal 
position to set the post-war agenda.  Therefore, the Western view toward the Roma 
inevitably is pressed upon Kosovo’s new democracy.  While not blatantly marginalizing, 
the discriminatory practices of the West against Roma have been characterized by the 
economic, social and political exclusion of the Roma.    If the West, more specifically the 
European Union, is to be a role model of the new Kosovo, what will that mean for the 
Roma?  If European Union member countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania, and Bulgaria can neglect to address violent movements against their own 
Roma, why should Kosovo protect theirs?  If France, Germany and Italy face no 
repercussions for expelling thousands of Roma from their borders, why should Kosovo 
make citizens of theirs?  
For Yugoslav Roma, democracy is much more part of the problem than part of 
the solution.  This is primarily because democracy addresses, empowers and 
safeguards the rights, interests and aspirations of the dominant ethnic collectivities 
much more than it empowers and safeguards the rights, interests and aspirations of 
other minorities (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007:16).  Salja Bajrush* words echo this 
ideology.  Salja is seventy-three years old.  Born in Kosovo, she worries she will not live 
long enough to see Roma have the "same democracy" Europe promises.  Salja sadly 
stated that she has a feeling that "this new democracy won't include our Romani 
children."  If the situation in Europe’s older democracies is any indicator of the Roma’s 
future, she is no doubt right. 
The European ideology is infused with a hatred for Roma. They are often 
depicted as the scapegoat for all of society’s ills, social, criminal and economic.  In the 
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United Kingdom, British Conservative Party Councillor Margaret Tookey stated in a 
public address in March, 1990, that she would like to see “all filthy, dirty Gypsies 
dumped in the sea” (Acton September 1990:13).  Ironically, in August 1999, more than 
a hundred Roma drowned when a boat smuggling them to Italy (for $1100 per head) 
from Kosovo capsized ("A Gypsy Awakening"  1999).  According to the Prague Daily 
Monitor, on April 2 2007, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek attacked equal 
opportunities during a speech at the launch of the European Year of Equal 
Opportunities for All.  Prime Minister Topolanek reportedly stated, "No well-meant effort 
to make equal that cannot be equal, no positive discrimination will guarantee the 
equality of opportunities. Positive discrimination sounds about the same as a pleasant 
beating."  Prime Minister Topolanek also attacked multiculturalism, saying that money 
spent by the state, "must go to the assimilation of individuals, not in support of the 
chimera of multiculturalism" ("Equal Opportunities for All"  April 2, 2007).  In Italy, a 
recent law requires that all Roma submit to fingerprinting while campaign posters 
displayed in Milan during the 2011 municipal election campaign warned against the risk 
of the city turning into a “Gypsy town.”  In Hungary, the far right Jobbik party, which 
holds four seats in the European Parliament, is well known for its hateful rhetoric 
against the Roma.  Among their racist ideologies is the desire to segregate Hungarian 
Roma in special camps.  Prefect of Rome, Achille Serra, after visiting several Romani 
camps around Rome in May of 2007, had this to say: “ten o’clock in the morning I saw 
children, dirty, playing with a ball . . . The women were not around because they are at 
the metro stealing purses and the men were sleeping because perhaps they worked all 
night robbing apartments” (Beard 2007).  This small sample of politicians and their 
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views against the Roma is representative of a Europe that is going to bring a 
multicultural democracy to Kosovo. 
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Kosovo’s Roma Today 
Roma are the last Yugoslavs. Roma from Kosovo have relatives in all of the 
states of former Yugoslavia, many of them living in extremely precarious 
circumstances. They have no idea what would happen if Kosovo became a 
republic, and the insecurity of the future makes most Roma cling even more to a 
sense that Yugoslavia was the best arrangement for everyone. Most of the Roma 
in Kosovo are Muslim and some of them are Christians. Some of the Kosovo 
Roma are pro-Albanian and some are pro-Serbian, but all of them are in the 
middle. They are caught between two sides of a war. Neither side is the Romani 
side, and all of their decisions are made from a position of weakness. There is no 
word in our vocabulary for war. The idea to take up guns and organise killing 
people  does not exist in our culture.   
Orhan Galjus29 
 
Despite the presence of international community-based projects, conflict building, 
special provisions and regulations to encourage the participation of minority groups, the 
relations between ethnic groups that currently live in Kosovo remain polarized, and 
dangerously influenced by ethnic strife.  Roma living in and returning to Kosovo 
continue to face enormous challenges across all spheres of life.  The 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees30 provide that persons fleeing 
persecution across borders deserve international protection, including freedom from 
forcible return (refoulement) and basic rights necessary for refugees to live a free, 
dignified, and self-reliant life.  These rights include the rights to earn a livelihood —to 
engage in wage-employment, self-employment, the practice of professions, and the 
ownership of property — freedom of movement and residence, and the issuance of 
travel documents (UN General Assembly January 31 1967; July 28 1951).  
 
                                                        
29 Personal testimony as told to the European Roma Rights Center, 1999. 
30 The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines who is a refugee, their 
rights and the legal obligations of states.  The 1967 Protocol removed geographical and 
temporal restrictions from the Convention.  
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Repatriation 
Though Kosovo is still a dangerous place, preventing the right to return in safety 
and dignity, Roma continually face forced return to Kosovo.   They are not able to seek 
asylum or refugee status because most countries consider them internally displaced 
persons (IDP).  In Germany, for example, they are given “tolerated status,”31 which is a 
special provision that allows the state to return the Roma at will.   The right to return is 
set out in Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as in 
various General Assembly Resolutions. The 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees refers to repatriation in terms of refoulement, whose application 
requires official refugee status: 
No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion (Article 33(1)). 
 
The UNHCR Statute calls on the High Commissioner to facilitate the voluntary 
repatriation of refugees when necessary.  The 1985 UNHCR Executive Committee 
Conclusion No. 40 (XXXVI) on Voluntary Repatriation emphasizes voluntary – “at their 
freely expressed wish” - return in “conditions of safety and dignity” (UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees October 18 1985).   
Despite these specific international mandates, Kosovo continues to sign 
readmission agreements with third countries that are eager to remove Roma from their 
borders.  In the words of one European Commission official, “there is no appetite in 
                                                        
31 Duldung, or “tolerated status,” is unique to Germany.  Those with such a status are barred 
from possessing regular employment, moving freely within Germany, and accessing most 
welfare programs.   
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Europe for more asylum seekers from that region.”32  Deportations began in late 2003 
with a short moratorium during the riots of 2004.  To date agreements have been signed 
with Albania, Belgium, France, Macedonia, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, 
Austria, Slovenia, Benelux countries, Czech Republic, and Sweden.   Negotiations with 
Italy and Hungary are currently underway.  In June 2007, the OSCE criticized the 
government of Kosovo and the UNMIK for these agreements before providing an 
environment of safe and sustainable returns.  According to Kosovo Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Bajram Rexhepi, Kosovo signed repatriation agreements in order to lessen visa 
restrictions on its citizens living in Europe (Lampard 2010). 
UNMIK estimates that a total of around 51,000 people were “readmitted” to 
Kosovo between 1999 and the end of 2007, citing Germany, Switzerland and Sweden 
as the countries returning the most people to Kosovo during that time (United Nations 
January 15, 2008).   
 
Table 7: Forced Returns, 2003-2010 
 
In 2010, a total of 5,198 persons were repatriated to Kosovo from Western European 
countries. This yields an average of about 100 persons per week. Of these, 65% came 
                                                        
32 Comment by European Commission official participating in a meeting about the 
situation in the Roma camps organized by the member of the European Parliament 
Baroness Emma Nicholson, attended by Human Rights Watch, Brussels, November 12, 
2008. 
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from just four countries: Germany alone accounted for 935 repatriations, followed by 
Austria with 888, Sweden with 793 and Switzerland with 736 (Knaus 2011).   
 
Table 8: 2010 Repatriation Statistics 
 
Most of the 5,198 returnees were Kosovo Albanian men. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians 
combined were the second largest group33; in total 671 Roma (40% of whom were 
women and girls), Ashkali and Egyptians were repatriated last year, constituting around 
13 percent of all repatriations. Every second Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians repatriated in 
2010 had lived in Germany. 
 Repatriated Roma experience the same problems as Roma previously living in 
Kosovo.  However, their problems are often compounded because the family, over the 
years, made a new life in another country.  Entire generations of children, many of 
whom have never set foot in Kosovo, have been forced to start their young lives over in 
foreign land still characterized by violence and ethnic strife. The Miftari family was 
                                                        
33 The 2010 breakdown is as follows: Albanians: 4,017, RAE: 671, Serbs: 269, Gorani: 96, 
Bosnian: 66, Others: 79. 
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returned after a sixteen-year stay in Germany where two of their sons, now seven and 
eleven and both profoundly deaf, were born. "In Germany the conditions were ideal. 
They went to a specialized school which picked them up from home each day and 
returned them," their father Shemsi Miftari said sadly. "Here they are forced to collect 
scrap metals and tin cans" (Hajdari August 18 2010). 
Proof of Citizenship 
Many Roma fled their homes in a state of panic, often leaving behind important 
documentation such as identity cards or birth certificates.  Others hold Yugoslav identity 
papers that are no longer recognized or valid.  Furthermore, most official records are no 
longer available in Kosovo following the removal of civil status registry books to Serbia, 
or damage to or destruction of the registry books as a result of the 1999 conflict (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees November 9 2009).  Kosovo does not 
recognize Serbian documentation.  This means that Roma who did have official 
documentation when Kosovo was under Serbian rule, no longer have legal 
documentation.   
Lack of civil registration34 impedes access to fundamental rights.  Those without 
it cannot access social security, health care, education, or employment and cannot 
participate in public life, vote or repossess their occupied property.  The issue is 
particularly difficult for Romani children.  Because parents lack proper documents they 
are unable to register the birth of a child, so the child is also without a legal identity.  
According to a UNICEF report (2009), 14% of children under 18 years old in the 
Albanian-majority area and 5% in Serb-majority area have not been registered (7).  
                                                        
34 The term civil registration is used in the meaning of civil status registration and 
registration as habitual resident of Kosovo in accordance with the applicable legislation.  
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Considering that OSCE estimates between 20% and 40% of Roma are not registered 
and that the birth rate among Roma is traditionally high, these numbers seem low.  The 
numbers also indicate Roma living among Albanians are more reluctant to seek 
registration for themselves and/or their children in Kosovo.  However, it is worth noting 
that a parallel system of Serb state administration exists still in northern Kosovo.  
Therefore, Roma residing in Serb areas may be registering their children under that 
system.  
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Figure 6: Birth non-registration rate for children under 18-years-of-age 
(The United Nations Children's Fund 2009) 
 
 
 
Beginning in Spring 2000, a Joint Registration Task Force of UN and OSCE set 
up civil registration offices in each municipality of Kosovo to help address the problem of 
civil registration.  Though reports indicate the situation is improving, many Roma are still 
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left stateless without basic social services and rights afforded citizenship.  Lack of 
documentation essentially comes down to “no registration, no rights.” 
 
Housing 
In the aftermath of war, lack of housing is not an uncommon problem facing 
(re)constructed governments.  However, in the aftermath of ethnic conflict during which 
thousands of minority homes were burned to the ground or occupied by the majority 
population, safe housing for IDP’s poses a complicated, if not unsolvable, dilemma. 
International organizations address the housing issues of refugees and IDPs through 
encampment.  It allows them to address security and solve the problems of 
accommodation, even if the security is biased or scarce and the accommodation is 
entirely substandard.  Research has indicated that warehoused (confined to camps or 
segregated settlements) IDPs do not experience physical security or adequate 
livelihood in the settlement structure.  A recent report from the US Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrants (February 2007)  argues that warehousing IDPs violates 
refugees rights and often reduces them to “enforced idleness, dependency, and despair” 
(1).  In Kosovo, Roma security is not only a heightened issue due to their ethnicity, but 
some local Serbs and Albanians allegedly oppose Roma IDPs being permanently 
resettled in their regions because they fear that changes in local demography could 
impact on local politics (OSCE-ODIHR 2010).  
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided 
assistance to the Roma IDPs, distributing food and organizing makeshift camps in 
Cesmin Lug and Zitkovac, to which many of the Roma moved in October 1999.  With 
the exception of Leposavic, all the IDP camps created were in the vicinity of the Trepça 
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complex.  The complex, where lead levels reach up to two-hundred times the accepted 
level, has been an environmental hazard for years.  What was supposed to be a 
temporary settlement turned into a decade, with a new generation of Romani children 
growing up in lead contamination.  In September 2004, WHO released a report 
demonstrating very high levels of lead contamination among the Roma population in all 
the camps.  Despite warnings from the World Health Organization, the international 
community continued to use the mine area for settlements.  Results of April 2008 tests 
demonstrated unacceptably high lead levels in the children tested. Out of the 53 
children tested, 21 had lead levels qualifying these children for immediate medical 
intervention (over 65 mcg/dl, which is the highest level the equipment can record) 
(Human Rights Watch 23 June 2009:38). 
Boro Boracic, a Serb who heads the Kosovo Red Cross that supervises the 
camp, said his agency is desperate for more food donations.  He lamented: ‘‘the simple 
people are suffering the most.'' Then, showing the suspicion that so many in Kosovo 
harbor toward Gypsies, he said: ‘‘some of them in the camp, they're just there because 
they heard the food was free. They're used to living without working'' (Heintz 1999).  
This statement from the head of the Red Cross in Kosovo is sadly indicative of the 
prevailing attitude toward Roma in Kosovo and abroad.  It serves to demonstrate well 
why the Roma, after more than ten years, are still living in squalor and uncertainty.   
 
Photo 9: A Romani girl stands near her home in the Chesmin Lug camp
Courtesy Darren McCollester, 
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The Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting
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Photo 10: Fushe Kosovo 
This abandoned railway building is home to Sadik Bajrami, his wife Igballe Kadrolli, and their three 
children. The Ashkali family was displaced from another part of the town in 1999, when their family house 
was burned.  At the time of this photo, the family had been living here for twelve years.  
(Courtesy Human Rights Watch in 2010). 
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Photo 11: Urosevac, Metal Container Housing 
These containers have no electricity and no running water.  Upwards of fifteen family members 
live in the small shed-like containers.   
(Courtesy Human Rights Watch 2010). 
 
Although much of the Romani Mahalla has been rebuilt, Roma return to camps 
out of fear for their safety.  The Mahalla is on the line dividing Serbs and Albanians, an 
area still wrought with ethnic tension and violence.  Others return to take advantage of 
Serbian welfare system that services that area of Kosovo and pays more than Kosovo 
benefits, or because their registration papers are Serbian.  Further, the parallel 
government in northern Kosovo provides educational and health care services to Roma. 
The Pinheiro Principles35 state that “All refugees and displaced persons have the 
right to have restored to them any housing, land and/or property of which they were 
arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, or to be compensated for any housing, land and/or 
property that is factually impossible to restore as determined by an independent and 
                                                        
35 United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and 
Displaced Persons 
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impartial tribunal” (Section II, Principle 2).  Though organizations are in place to restore 
property rights to displaced persons in Kosovo, the process requires proper 
documentation.  Again, the lack of documentation impedes the Roma’s ability to try and 
return to their homes.  As is the case in much of southeast Europe, the Roma have lived 
in informal settlements over several generations, often without any type of property 
deed.  The transition to private property has opened the door to capitalistic greed and 
many Roma returned to find their previous lands occupied.  Even when Roma do have 
property deeds, public authorities fail to enforce the laws and there are widespread 
allegations of “nepotism, corruption and links with organized crime” (Republic of Kosovo 
Ombudsperson Institution July 21 2008).  To date, none of the municipalities in Kosovo 
have taken steps towards finding sustainable housing solutions for Roma, nor are there 
currently any forthcoming projects in their budget plans to meet the housing needs of 
Roma. 
 
Education 
According to the Ministry of Education in Kosovo36, there are no statistical data 
on the percentage of Romani children attending primary education (of the total Roma 
children of the primary school age), primarily because no ethnically disaggregated 
census exists in Kosovo37 and many Roma children are not registered anywhere. This 
statement is problematic in two ways: first, it reveals the Ministry’s awareness that 
Romani children are not registered; second, it demonstrates the Ministry’s lack of 
initiative to perform needs assessments of the Romani community.  While the latter is 
                                                        
36 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with an official from the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology, August 12, 2010. 
37 The last census in Kosovo was collected in 1991. 
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not meant to imply a total disregard by the educational system in addressing Romani 
needs in the community, it is a telling point because such assessments are required in 
order to secure programmatic funding.  Gleaning information from various 
organizational reports throughout Kosovo municipalities provides a snapshot that may 
be generalizable to the larger Romani population.  For example, in the municipality of 
Gjilan, once the center of Romani education in Kosovo, UNHCR reported a population 
of 1,160 Roma families.  A survey of those families exposed that not one of the children 
from these families attended school (Whalen July 2003).   
Even without data, it is not difficult to predict the problems Romani children face 
in the parallel education system: language barriers, issues of safety, costs of school 
supplies, and general frustration with the system by students and parents. 
Despite the fact that the new Kosovo constitution38 recognizes the right of students to 
access education in their own language no provisions have been made to honor that 
right.  Albanian schools teach only in the Albanian, Turkish and Bosnian languages.  
With the exception of a few municipalities, Serbian schools teach only in the Serbian 
language.  Neither offers instruction in the other language.  Additionally, none of the 
schools have curricula on Romani culture, which can serve to deepen the division 
between Romani and non-Romani students.  In Fushe Kosove, Human Rights Watch 
(2009) spoke to an Ashkali family of five, deported from Kusel, Germany to Kosovo in 
the winter of 2006. The family fled the war in 1999, and stayed in Germany on a 
                                                        
38 See Art. 4.4(b), Constitutional Framework, UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, 15 May 2001, and 
subsequent amendments (Constitutional Framework); Art. 19.1, Law on the Use of 
Languages, UNMIK Regulation 2006/51 (Law on the Use of Languages); Art. 59.2, 
Constitution promulgated on 15 June 2008 (2008 Constitution); Art. 8.1, 2008 Law on the 
Rights of Communities. 
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renewable toleration permit.  None of the children were going to school at the time 
because their Albanian was “not up to standard.”  But also because their German 
school certificates were “not recognized in Kosovo.”  The father, Avni Lahi, said that all 
his children used to go to school in Germany and were “very good students.” 
 Albanian and Serb children do not attend school together.  For example, at the 
Sveti Sava school in Bresje, students attend education at separate times and on 
separate floors without communication between school managers, teachers and 
students of the two systems (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe April 
2009:19-20).  The OSCE report of April 2009 provides an astounding example of 
parallel education and segregation involving Roma and Ashkali students: 
Primary education in Janjevë/Janjevo illustrates further paradoxes of co-
habitation. The school has three different directors and names. The Serbian 
curriculum director calls it ”Vladimir Nazor’; the Kosovo Croat director calls it 
“Janjevo;” the Lipjan/Lipljan municipality and Kosovo Albanian director  call it 
“Shtefan Gjeqovi.” The Kosovo Croat director is appointed by the municipality but 
pupils of this community attend Serbian curriculum education. Kosovo Albanian, 
Ashkali and Kosovo Turk students receive education in Albanian on one floor; 
Kosovo Croat, Kosovo Bosniak, and Roma students receive education in Serbian 
on the other. (17) 
 
Which school Romani children attend is an indicator of which group they 
associate with outside of school.  This can pose a danger, particularly in multi-ethnic 
environments where ethnic violence continues.  Freedom of safe movement in these 
environments prevent many Romani children from attempting to attend classes.  Further, 
even though Kosovo has passed anti-discrimination legislation banning all forms of 
discrimination and segregation, the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (UNMIK 
and the Government of Kosovo) (July 2007) recognize multiple cases of discrimination 
against members of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities within the school system.   
 128 
Suzana was eleven and Anita ten when they were repatriated from Germany to Banjae 
Pejes in Western Kosovo.  When their father went to register them for school, the 
director turned him away, arguing that without school certificates from their previous 
school in Germany, Suzana and Anita could not register. The father had a friend in 
Germany send him the school certificates.  When he returned to the school, the director 
still refused to enroll the girls. This time, the director argued he could not accept the 
original German school certificates without verification by the Ministry of Education in 
Priština.  Discouraged and upset, the father gave up.  UNICF research documented 
several school directors in towns and villages who actively prevented repatriated Roma, 
Ashkali and Egyptian children from enrolling at their schools. (Knaus 2011) 
 
Employment 
Kosovo has the highest unemployment rate in Europe and Central Asia at 45% 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2011) and rising.  In 2006, the unemployment rate for 
Roma in Kosovo was 73.2% (O'Higgins and Ivanov 2006:10).  Today, organizational 
reports range from 80% to 90% unemployment within Kosovo’s Romani population.  For 
Roma the chances of gaining stable employment are impeded by their lack of 
documentation, generally low level of education, and discriminatory practices in a 
competitive and newly privatized, but small marketplace.  Businesses in Kosovo are 
generally small with only a handful of employees.  Before the war, Kosovo’s largest 
employment sector was agriculture (53% of Kosovo’s land is agricultural).  However, the 
amount of foreign food aid pouring in to the country after the war crippled small farmers, 
many of whom abandoned their farms.  Kosovo’s economy is dominated by illegal 
activities: drug smuggling, organized crimes and trafficking.  UNMIK estimates that 
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organized crime accounts for 15% to 20% of Kosovo’s economy, “a figure that would 
presumably be far higher if one subtracts the substantial portion of Kosovo GDP made 
up of foreign aid” (Rosenthal February 2 2008).  There is little room for Roma in 
Kosovo’s economy.  
Even when employment does not require an education, Roma are discriminated 
against in hiring practices all over Europe.  Common stereotypes against Roma often 
prevent employers from hiring a Rom over a member of another ethnic group.  There is 
a prevailing stereotype that Roma don’t want to work, don’t show up regularly, are loud, 
argumentative, irresponsible and lazy.  Those that do find work are often paid less than 
non-Roma and hired under a contract basis without benefits.   In a recent survey, 
Human Rights Watch (2010) found that some municipalities (Gjakova, Prizren, Lipjan, 
Kamenice, and Fushe Kosove) employed Roma, but only in small numbers. In most 
cases, there was only one Romani employee for the entire municipality, and the 
individuals concerned had low-level jobs, such as drivers, doormen and cleaners. The 
representation of Roma within the public work sectors seems to indicate that public 
companies in Kosovo have made no effort to integrate Romani employees in their 
workforce.  Kosovo Police Service (KPS), Kosovo Electric Company (KEK), Post and 
Telecommunication Kosovo (PTK), Kosovo Railroad, Kosovo Transport, Priština Airport 
have nearly 20,000 employees; however only 0.5% of the employees are Roma 
(Republic of Kosovo 2008:9).   
Gani Elshani, 45, worked in a pharmaceutical factory in Prizren for 18 years with 
other Roma. When the factory was privatized he and the other Roma were let go with 
the explanation that the factory was cutting back on employees.  According to him, none 
 130 
of the other Roma workers were employed after the privatization of the factory 
either ("Memorandum of the European Roma Rights Centre: In the Aftermath of Ethnic 
Cleansing: Continued Persecution of Roma, Ashkalis, Egyptians and Others Perceived 
as "Gypsies" in Kosovo "  2006).  Considering there are currently no labor laws or labor 
courts in Kosovo, private employers are able to hire and fire as they wish and Roma are 
more likely to be the first to go.   
In order to provide for their family, many Roma are often forced to seek income 
through dangerous and often illegal means.  During a monitoring investigation in North 
Mitrovica, the Kosovo Roma Refugee Foundation (2011) discovered a Serbian smelting 
operation that paid Roma, including children, to extract lead from vehicle batteries. No 
protective clothing was provided to the Roma and the facility was without washing areas.  
Another income generating practice, referred to as “urban mining” or “rag and bone,” 
involves combing city dumps and trash areas for anything that can be sold.  According 
to NGO staff in the Roma community of Gjakovë/Djakovica in the municipality of Pejë, 
80% of Romani families collected rubbish for a living (Kayo Kasai January 2004).    
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Photo 12: Urban Mining 
Photo by Samir Delic from the Urban Miners exhibition at the Belgrade Center for Cultural 
Decontamination, 2011. 
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Conclusion 
In a recent sermon, the Serbian Patriarch Irinej pointed out that Kosovo is the 
holy Serbian land which is soaked in blood and cemented by the bones of the holy 
martyrs (Diocese of Raska-Prizren 2011).  According to Van Evera’s hypothesis on 
nationalism and war, ethnic mythologies that are passed from generation to generation 
become distorted and exaggerated (Van Evera 2001).  This was no doubt the case for 
Serbian nationalism.  Rooted in ancient beliefs postulating that Kosovo was the cradle 
of Serbian civilization, Serb nationalists dug up the bones of the past to maintain claim 
to Kosovo.  The Albanians sought to draw borders around their language and culture, 
while looking to Western ideologies of democracy and modernity.  Nationalism in 
Kosovo stands in the threshold of perennial and modernist approaches.   However, we 
must not reduce it to mean the perennial side of Kosovo’s nationalism is based on the 
ancient blood feuds of savage mountainous people.   That “intellectual sloth” of doing so 
is, as Glen Bowman Bowman (1994) argues, to “not only deny such ethnographic 
evidence and ignore the recent history of modernization in Yugoslavia but also 
effectively cast Yugoslavs out beyond the pale of what we term ‘human society’ (172-3). 
The approach to nationalism in this study sought to synthesize the three-part 
nation-building and nationalism continuums of Hechter (2000), Hobsbawn (1992) and 
Hroch (2000) as applied to Kosovo.  The first phase is based on history, national identity 
and direct rule.  The second phase is a period of relative quiet during which nationalist 
movements mobilize and recruit.  The last phase is a mass movement of peripheral 
nationalism.  The theories in this approach take a middle ground between perennial and 
modernist nationalism. That is, they recognize the validity of history, require cultural 
homogeneity, and interweave in the importance of cultural destiny, while acknowledging 
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the “supranatural restructuring of the globe” (Hobsbawm 1992).  The model is 
particularly fitting to Kosovo, a new nation that is trapped between perennial and 
modernist ideologies.  Nationalism in Kosovo built up along this continuum within which 
various factors played a role in propelling it forward, ultimately leading it toward ethnic 
violence and war.   
Even within the framework of the above phases, nationalism does not occur in a 
vacuum.  There must be a threat, real or perceived, to the ideologies of the people 
within a specific territory.  In the case of Kosovo, an autonomous region, the threat 
came in the form of direct rule and the opposition to that rule.  The Serbs were afraid of 
losing Kosovo; Kosovo was afraid of Serb domination.  Once the walls of communism 
came crashing down throughout Eastern Europe, a new threat from the outside arose.  
Kosovo had a choice: maintain the bonds of communism or embrace the European 
model of capitalism, the latter most certainly enabling, with the assistance of the West, 
freedom from Serbian rule.  What was a choice of the lesser of two evils appeared to 
the West to be a desperate plea for help from Serbian oppression as well as an 
opportunity for the West to destroy the last communist hold out in Europe, thus bringing 
Yugoslavia into the European model.  As we have seen, the call was answered. 
History plays a critical role in the development of nationalism in Kosovo.  In 
perennial theory, history is the search for "collective immortality" (Smith 1999). The 
modernists confine nationalism to rudiments of modernity, while pointing out the “myth” 
of historicity.  What gets lost in the theoretical debates is that the two views are not 
mutually exclusive.  Instead of making a “myth” out of a culture’s history, we can 
recognize that the process of nationalism occurred before modernity and alongside it.  
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Additionally, as an agricultural, low-culture region, Kosovo was not making a move into 
modernity.  Despite the Western designs for Kosovo, the country has yet to have a full 
electrical grid and is barely moving into the processes of industrialization, relying 
instead on an economy that is seeped in criminality and corruption.  Unless human 
trafficking and drug trade is the move to a modern empire, Kosovo is only moving 
backwards, even with Western assistance.     
Hammond contends the intervention in the Balkans was “part and parcel” of the 
European Union’s project of dominance over its eastern border, a “cultural racism” that 
has dominated the last fifteen years of EU enlargement predicated on a “symbolic 
ordering” that places the region at a “lower level on the evolutionary scale” (19).  The 
playing of the “race card” emphasized the ethnic differences in Kosovo, an issue that 
could only be resolved by solidifying borders based on those differences.   This process 
is far from over in Kosovo as proposals for northern partition cross international 
conference tables.  Now that the region is infused with the ideal of European 
homogeneity, the process will not be complete until her borders are ethnically pure.  
Members of a dominant group who are not successful in achieving their goals 
unleash “frustration-produced-aggression” against the closest group that cannot 
retaliate (Allport 1958 331-32, Dollard 1939).  With the West watching, why not choose 
a group that the West also marginalizes?  The Roma served as a perfect scapegoat for 
the warring parties.  Hobsbawm (1992) suggests that political loyalty and ethnicity are 
linked (66).  Though there exists a degree of ethnic mimicry among Roma in the region, 
on the whole they belonged to neither Serbs nor Albanians.  They could therefore not 
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be trusted with loyalty to the cause of either party.  They found themselves between two 
very dangerous fires, forced to choose a side or perish within them.   
After autonomy, the Western ideal of wealth and prosperity did not materialize.  
Instead of capitalism, the transition took place in the form of what Hayden (1992) refers 
to as “state chauvinism,” when socialism's "class enemy" is replaced by the national 
enemy identified by the particular local chauvinism (659-60).   With the Serbs largely 
cleansed for Kosovo, something – or someone – must be blocking Kosovo from 
achieving its goal.  It is important to reiterate Friedländer‘s (1997) assumption that 
scapegoat ideology exaggerates the malice and power of the victim in order to 
legitimize blame, especially considering the Roma had little nationalist ideology of their 
own and were not in any way mobilized in Kosovo.  However, because some Roma 
sided with the Serbs, they must be impeding the ideal and likely still plotting the 
destruction of the new Kosova.  The generalization of Roma as Serb collaborators 
made them the new state enemy.  They could not retreat to their home nation, as the 
Serbs did, because they had none. In fact, those who fled to Serbia were often turned 
away; not only might they be collaborators with the Albanians, but they simply were not 
Serbs.   Further, after years of refuge in Western countries, the West believes it is now 
time to force Roma to return to Kosovo where they continue to live as scapegoats for Al 
Kosovar frustrations.   
 The situation of Roma in Kosovo today is shockingly reminiscent of the 
Porrajamos.  Roma are blamed for the ills of society.  Burned out of their homes, they 
are forced to live in isolated camps.  They receive no recognition as victims of war, no 
restitution, no help.  The ongoing war trials, other than a passing footnote, offer them no 
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voice.  The international community continues to ignore the worsening situation of 
Kosovo’s Roma.  Indeed, if cultural homogeneity is a template for the European model, 
one cannot help but ask, what does that mean for minorities like the Roma, not only in 
Kosovo, but also across Europe? 
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Endnote: Future Research 
 
Throughout my research, I repeatedly touched upon areas that I believe deserve more 
attention than time and space allowed to be given here.  The issue of gender, for 
example, merits more attention particularly given the widespread cases of rape during 
the Kosovo conflict.   Kosovo’s recent place as a hub of human trafficking is especially 
relevant to gender issues plaguing post-war Kosovo.  The US Department of State 
reported in June of 2009 that “Kosovo is a source, transit, and destination country for 
women and children trafficked across national borders for the purpose of commercial 
sexual exploitation. Kosovan women and children are also trafficked within Kosovo for 
the same purpose. NGOs reported that child trafficking, particularly from Roma 
communities, for the purpose of forced begging, was an increasing problem.”  Though 
statistical data from within Romani communities is unlikely available, investigation into 
the impact of rape and trafficking of Romani women and children should be included as 
another aspect of the danger of forced returns. 
The nuances of race, nation and ethnicity were not clearly defined, particularly in 
an historical sense of parsing out the differences.  The complexities of different brands 
of socialism should also be more thoroughly detailed, especially during the shift from 
Tito to the collective presidency.   The role of the West, or “Balkanization from above,” 
as an influence on nationalism was a theory that emerged from this work.  Given the 
complexity of such a bold statement and the research necessary to construct a 
compelling argument, the theory was only briefly introduced here.  I believe the 
foundational research would make an excellent springboard for a deeper study.   
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